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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Of Poverty, Race, and Politics
During the just completed presidential race, we
heard a good many complaints to the effect that the
candidates were avoiding some of the most difficult
problems facing the nation. Critics regularly deplored the unwillingness of George Bush and
Michael Dukakis to take on in explicit detail such
politically sensitive issues as the budget and trade
deficits. Yet the critics of avoidance did some significant avoiding of their own. They were no more
likely than were the candidates to draw attention to
what is arguably the most critical domestic issue of
American politics: the already desperate and still
deteriorating situation of the urban underclass.
Reasons for the anti-avoiders' avoidance are not
difficult to find . The underclass issue touches on
some of the most sensitive and intractable matters
in our public life. It involves, first of all, the subject
of race (the composition of the underclass is disproportionately black), and it. has become virtually
impossible to discuss racial matters in America without causing offense and without suspicions and
charges of racism--or, at the very least, racial insensitivity-coming immediately into play. No one
wants to talk frankly about racial matters today because one cannot do so and come away unsullied.
Racial sensitivities aside, media commentators and
politicians alike hesitate to address the problem of
the underclass because they are by now so baffled
as to what might be done to find solutions for it.
Americans characteristically approach public policy
issues with the often naive but also often salutary
assumption that there exists no problem for which
it is beyond the wit of society to find a cure. But
that optimism has become difficult to sustain in the
case of the nation's inner city dilemma (or set of dilemmas). Pathologies of crime, unemployment, family instability, and educational failure persist, impervious alike to the Great Society schemes of the Left
and the market-reliant expectations ("a rising tide
lifts all boats") of the Right. That which we cannot
solve we would just as soon ignore.
It is to the uncomfortable subject of the underclass that Charles Murray, author of Losing Ground
and the recently-published In Pursuit, addresses
himsel~ in a controversial essay, "The Coming of
Custodial Democracy," in Commentary (September,
1988). Murray expresses skepticism about the
widely-applauded welfare reform law passed a short
November, 1988

time ago by Congress. He doubts that it will do
much to guide the poor out of the trap of welfare
dependency into which the policies of the past have
led them. The point is not that nothing in the way
of government programs works. To the contrary,
government programs, especially local programs,
"to help those who are helping themselves-the displaced worker with a history of employment, the
drug-abuser who is motivated to quit, the dropout
who is motivated to study-do sometimes work."
But two categories of programs have failed conspicuously and consistently: large federal programs intended to change behavior (as opposed to dealing out commodities or cash), and any program, small or large, local
or federal, trying in particular to change the behavior of
a clientele that is not already socialized into norms of
working-class and middle-class society. Federal programs to
help the underclass fall into both categories. We have
spent vast amounts of money on these programs over the
past decades, but no matter how much we spend, we still
do not know how--let me repeat and emphasize these
words, we do not know how--to change the behavior of significant proportions of the urban underclass through social
engineering.

Murray's pessimism stems from the experience of
recent years. Reformers, he says, have supposed
that the problem of unemployment has to do with
the absence of jobs. The problem, that is, is supposedly structural: either there are no jobs at all, or
those that do exist "require qualifications which
members of the underclass do not have, or are located in places where they do not live, or offer such
dispiritingly low wages that they are not worth the
effort." Yet the evidence of the recent economic recovery, Murray argues, suggests otherwise. Many
urban labor markets are now approaching conditions of full employment, and blacks active in the
labor market have benefited accordingly. But
therein lies the problem: a large number of young
black men who are neither in school or in ill health
appear to remain outside the category of those
working or actively looking for work. Murray concludes that the argument that "there just aren't any
jobs" is ringing increasingly hollow, and that the
problem of young black men remaining outside the
labor market "seems to be extremely resistant to improvements in the economy."
From all this, Murray draws gloomy conclusions.
He anticipates that a new liberal consensus will
gradually emerge on the problem of the underclass,
one that will dismiss as futile efforts to bring large
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numbers of its members into the mainstream of
American life and that will therefore conclude that
the only humane path is simply to provide food,
housing, medical care, and other social services to
the underclass much in the way that such services
are currently provided for American Indians who
live on reservations.
Should such a despairingly paternalistic consensus
emerge, it would of course mark signal failure for
society in general and liberalism in particular. During most of the period since the New Deal, liberals
have argued that under the leadership of an affirmative national government people can be rescued
from poverty and life on the margins of society for
full participation in all aspects of American social
life. Despite conservative charges to the contrary,
the liberals' dominant ideal has not been that of a
nation of dependents provided for by a custodial
elite but of a society of equals who have to some extent been brought to the possibility of equal participation through the prudent, humane, and limited
intervention of activist government.
Murray and others contend that over the past two
decades liberals have gradually edged away from
that traditional vision in the direction of a more
paternalistic ideal, one that in the face of Great Society failures is skeptical of the ability of the poor
to provide for themselves (even with some government help) and yet whose passion for equal outcomes has intensified even as its faith in the ability
of people to achieve equality on their own has withered. Thus the drift to an ever more interventionist, collectivist, and custodial style of liberal politics. Murray and his friends may exaggerate the extent of the drift, but the current disarray within the
liberal community itself as to the proper definition
of liberalism suggests that they are on to something.
Be that as it may, the problem of the underclass
endures, and while judgments as to the probable
causes and cures of the problem may legitimately
differ, it does seem clearly to be the case that deep
cultural forces are involved, forces that will not
alone be overcome either by welfare-reform legislation or by the stimulus of an expanding economy.

a

A recent study indicates the direction toward
which change should aim. That study suggests that
the likelihood of winding up in poverty dwindles to
near zero among people who accomplish three
things: finish high school, get and stay married, and
hold on to a first job for at least a year. It's easy
to lay out the desired ends but less easy to prescribe
ways of achieving them. Government intervention
will necessarily play a part, but our recent history
4

strongly indicates that government by itself will not
get us where we want to go. Indeed, studies like
those of Murray suggest that excessive government
intervention can be counterproductive.
One thing is certain. The current situation is intolerable, and requirements of both social stability and
moral decency demand that the new President place
Cl
this issue at the top of his agenda.

Save Us the Whales
There is no criticism of American public life more
pervasive, Left to Right, than the charge that our
priorities are out of joint. Conservatives argue that we
dribble away our resources on government projects of
marginal benefit to the public good, while liberals express outrage over private indulgences that persist in
the face of desperate public needs. Dispassionate observers can readily find instances of misallocation of
commitment and effort on either side, but there are
occasions when the problem is not misallocation according to ideology but looniness by any estimate.
So it has been, at least from our angle of vision, in
the situation of the stranded whales near Barrow,
Alaska. Because of an unseasonable growth of pack
ice, three California gray whales (only two of which
survived) found themselves trapped some five miles
from open water and freedom. For reasons we cannot
fathom, the news media of the world turned the plight
of the whales into a major event and followed in minute detail efforts made to rescue them.
The matter took on extraordinary importance. President Reagan indicated a personal interest. The Russian navy got involved. So did several large oil companies. So also did the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Commerce Department, the Air Force, the
Coast Guard, and the Army National Guard. The
town of Barrow announced expenditures of over
$300,000 on the project, and with all the other groups
involved, we are obviously talking about total costs in
the tens of millions of dollars. For two whales. It was
the equivalent of the city of New York deciding to
mobilize the full weight of its resources-and focus the
attention of the national media--on the problem of a
cat (all right, two cats) caught up a tree.
The story has an apparently happy ending. The surviving whales have found their way to open water,
freedom, and presumed good health and long life. We
wish them well. We hope at the same time that the
next human/animal interest story that the media and
the public take up has more intrinsic significance to it
than this one did. There really are more important
things under the sun.
••

••
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Peter Augustine Lawler

BLOOM AND THE COLLEGE TEACHER
Christian Reflections on the limits of a Modern Classic

Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind
(Simon and Schuster, 1987) is now a genuine American phenomenon. The book's long and still continuing
run on the best-seller lists has made Bloom perhaps
the first professor of political philosophy to become a
millionaire by writing in his field. But the book is not
only popular; it is respected.
Bloom has emerged out of relative obscurity to become one of the authorities on American education.
When former Secretary of Education William Bennett
speaks of the virtues of the Great Tradition and the
Great Books, and condemns American universities for
ignoring them in their trendiness and greediness, most
leading scholars sneer. When Bloom does the same,
they respectfully disagree, conceding that he has made
any number of thoughtful and erudite observations in
support of his case.
My purpose is simply to consider a few things college teachers can learn from this book. Following
Bloom's fine example, I am not going to do so in a
"value free" way. In the great tradition of "instant
classics," Bloom's book already has become in some respects altogether too authoritative. Yet Bloom is an authority who cries out to be questioned.
The Closing of the American Mind seems to be an afterthe-fact description. The American mind, from
Bloom's view, is closed. His most compelling evidence
for this conclusion is his account of the present stage
of the history of Western thought. The human mind,
actually, seems to be closed, because the European
mind is no longer distinct from America's, and
Bloom's silent assumption is that everything Eastern
will eventually be Westernized.
This homogenization of "mind" (as in "American
mind") is one telling sign of its emptiness. Liberated or
philosophic thought must emerge out of and express

Peter Augustine Lawler, a frequent contributor to The
Cresset, teaches at Berry College in Mount Berry, Georgia.
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itself in opposition to a particular culture and political
community. Without such particularistic opposition,
the universalistic vision of philosophy has nothing to
question, and by which to be questioned. The success
of the philosophers' practical project beginning with
Socrates or Plato, to make the world safe for
philosophy, has achieved too much success for its own
good. The world is now too domesticated, too tame.
The radical questioning which is indispensable for the
genuine pursuit of wisdom has come to an end.

Relativism, applied constantly,
paralyzes action. No one would ever
die or even attempt to prevail over
others in speech for a prejudice
known merely to be a prejudice.
Americans are now, from Bloom's perspective, too
prejudiced against prejudice really to question prej..~dice . They are liberated from firm moral attachments or convictions for moral emptiness. All the essence has been sucked out of human existence. It is
unreasonable really to believe in or devote oneself to
anything in particular. The truth is u nderstood to be
the truth of "relativism"; all beliefs are equally untrue.
In principle, of course, one is free to choose any particular conviction, but there is no reason for any such
choice.
Relativism, applied consistently, paralyzes action. No
one would ever die or even attempt to prevail over
others in speech for a prejudice known merely to be
a prejudice. Relativism is the great enemy of racism,
it is true, as well as sexism (including, as Bloom shows,
the natural differences between the sexes that may really be morally and politically relevant). It is also the
enemy of patriotism, including all the d uties of citizens. It is, more generally, the enemy of all human
distinctions and hence, ultimately, of h umanity itself.
That I am not certain enough or passionate enough to
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act is the enervating truth underlying a consistent understanding of relativism's "virtue" of tolerance.
Bloom seems to see nothing but this virtue in today's
students. They are "nice," he says, or politely unassertive. They neither love nor hate Bloom or that for
which he stands. They are polite about him. They are
too unerotic to love Platonic ideas. They are not spirited enough to hate them. But they will memorize
them, if necessary, on their way to their M.B.A.s.
Today's students, as Bloom presents them, are, although he does not say so explicitly, caricatures of
Socrates. They imitate his practical detachment without his theoretical devotion. They are products of the
conviction that all human beings ought to imitate Socrates, that Socrates is the model human type. They unconsciously believe themselves to be wiser than Socrates. They extend the relativizing or rationally destructive power of the "Socratic method" to Socrates
himself. His "thing" has no more validity than anyone
else's. His moral or vocational seriousness is no less
ridiculous than anyone else's. Socrates was not nice.
Niceness requires a wholly consistent detachment from
human life's drama of moral choice by mortals.
Bloom has many ways of showing how American
education--conceived as a perverse product of the
project of the philosophers, with American professors
viewing themselves as continuing and radicalizing Socrates' work-has emptied this drama of its content.
But one of these in particular is most striking, because
it most simply and directly challenges the prejudices of
most professors. Bloom describes the moral richness
which permeated his grandparents' life and home; the
moral drama of the Bible was alive for them. His
cousins, each of whom possesses a doctoral degree and
is better educated technically than the grandparents,
speak of morality in egoistic cliches. For them, there
is no moral drama. Their view of morality is laughable. They are inferior morally to their grandparents
because they have lost contact, as a result primarily of
their education, with a profound moral tradition.
American professors today typically view freedom
from tradition or "orthodoxy" to be humanly desirable
moral liberation. A professor with an office near mine
displays on his door the Socratic slogan, "Question authority." Once questioned, the thought goes, authority
is no longer authoritative. The result is human autonomy.
The professorial task, so conceived, is to teach students to "think critically," to discover and to reject
their prejudices. But there is no denying that in most
cases the most powerful effect of such teaching is the
production of rationalizations for the rejection of stern
moral demands. The theoretical view that all limits on
self-expression that are not freely chosen, that are not
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in accord with one's own critical thoughts and idiosyncratic feelings, are illegitimate is, of course, in accord
with the untutored tastes of young people. They have
to be taught, against the grain, to view what is authoritative as authoritative. If they are to be taught,
they need teachers who do not believe that relativism
is true. They need teachers with the courage of their
convictions.
Even Socrates, not to mention Aristophanes or
Rousseau, knew that the Socratic method could not
produce a nation, particularly a democracy, full of
Socratic men and women. Its popularization produces
the easygoing, democratic thought, "do your own
thing," without any reason for choosing a difficult or
ennobling thing over an easy or degrading one. The
ugliness of democracy, for Plato, was that it did not
teach mortals that they must use their time well. In its
unwillingness to consider any restraints on individual
freedom, it refuses to come to terms with the human
reality of the scarcity of time. Socrates, in an amazing,
seemingly inhuman way, seemed to confront his mortality without any hopes or fears. But his example,
Plato thought and experience confirms, cannot become the general rule. The rational destruction of the
mythic foundations of what most human beings hope
for and fear from death produces people like Socrates
except without his animation.
Bloom's cousins are liberated from traditional morality. They are free to choose their own "lifestyles,"
but they do not have the spiritual resources to choose
well. They have not been improved as human beings
by American education; they are, in the crucial sense,
not educated at all. Although Bloom, perhaps out of
personal delicacy, does not do this explicitly, he invites
the reader to consider their relationships with and
their education of their children.
Bloom's cousins, no doubt, excelled in school because they were well-reared by their "authoritarian"
parents. Their children, one suspects, are not likely
even to be disciplined enough to benefit from a firstrate technical education. Consider the Americans who
excel in disproportionate numbers in such education
today: Asian-Americans. They are motivated primarily, they say, out of honor and fear, both qualities
rooted in the unquestioned acceptance of their parents' traditional authority. As Americans become more
Americanized, as they lose real contact with pre-modern culture, they actually become less open to higher
education. Parents lack any moral content to pass on
to their children. They cannot tell them why they must
possess the self-restraint necessary to be open to serious education.
There is an equally Socratic rejoinder scribbled in by
some perspicacious commentator below the slogan on
The Cresset
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the Socratic professor's door: "Why?" Why should authority be questioned? Have we professors typically
forgotten the questionableness of such questioning?
The answer to the first question that comes to mind
most readily is that we question in pursuit of the truth.
But are Bloom's cousins, never mind their children,
closer to the truth than his grandparents? Their alleged wisdom did not come to them through their actual imitation of Socrates. They do not genuinely question the truth of relativism. Their dogmatism or orthodoxy, moreover, surely reveals less about the true
possibilities of human life than that of their grandparents. Determinedly anti-authoritarian education does
not lead students to the truth . It instead closes their
minds in an unprecedently complete way.

Bloom seems to complain that there is
no moral majority with teeth to strike
out against his Socratic, amoral
detachment, which is considerably more
flagrant than was that of Socrates.
In Bloom's experience at the best universities,
today's students enter class already convinced that relativism is true. They are already aware that it is the
culture's mark of sophistication and common decency.
They do not have to be taught to be prejudiced
against prejudice, and professors who teach with that
goal in mind are simply reinforcing prejudice. (One
must add that such professors probably receive outstanding student evaluations, as long as they can entertain, too. Unadorned relativism, after all, is boring.)
Bloom, disconcertingly enough, does not report on his
considerable success in getting today's students to
question the truth of relativism. He gives the impression that they are too dosed-minded for significant
success to be expected.
Bloom endorses the Great Books method of instruction, despite its limitations. These books embody the
Great Tradition of the West, the vigor of which has always depended upon the intensity of the conflict between philosophical and traditional education or, ·to
put the dispute somewhat differently, between reason
and revelation as the source of moral authority. In the
great works of the philosophers, poets, and theologians, the human drama of moral choice still lives.
Every choice is questionable in light of its fundamental
alternatives, but, given human nature or the human
condition, choices must still be made.
But, as presented by Bloom, this method seems
reactionary. The great books were written in the conNovember, 1988

text of real, spirited political and cultural hostility to
philosophy. Their teaching is shaped and inspired by
the character of the opposition. America, lacking such
spirited hostility, has taken all the fun out of free
thinking, and the drama out of the choice for or
against philosophy. Bloom says he had to learn from
his American experience the degree of dependence of
philosophy upon culture. He experienced the necessity
of its presence by its absence.
Bloom believes that he, as a philosopher, has missed
something quite fundamental because he has no real
experience of Socrates' practical predicament. He
seems to complain that there is no moral majority with
teeth to strike out against his Socratic, amoral detachment, which is considerably more flagrant than was
that of Socrates. The traditional problem for
philosophers has been the powerful hostility of religion to their atheism. Hence, fearing the fate of Socrates, they presented themselves publicly as believers.
But the traditional problem is not Bloom's; America
has no objection to his atheism.
Bloom does not bother to present himself as a good
family man or a good citizen, and his personal atheism
is never denied. He makes it clear that he is not part
of the moral majority or even its friend. He does not
even pay it the compliment of believing it to be strong
enough to be feared . Bloom sees no need to be a hero,
even a Socratic hero, and he does not flatter his audience. He might say that the enthusiastic reception his
book has received from allegedly cultural conservatives
is not evidence that he is wrong about the American
mind, after all.
Bloom identifies himself with Socrates, while showing his fellow teachers the limits of this pedagogical
approach. Socrates needs a healthy cultural and political order to oppose, but he himself cannot participate
in the creation of such an order. Bloom cannot tell his
students what must be done to revive human life. He
ironically disdains all activism, whether liberal, radical,
or conservative, especially under contemporary conditions.
Bloom's Great Books education gives students a
sense of what has been lost and offers ways to ask the
permanent human questions. But it is very short on
answers. It does not provide the certainty about the
human good that must be at the foundation of political and cultural transformation. For the philosopher,
the only genuine community, says Bloom, is the community of deracinated thinkers. But he also says that
most human beings and, it turns out, even the
philosophers require non-philosophic communitarian
roots. The educators and statesmen of the future,
Bloom suggests, need teachers other than Bloom.
The modern philosopher who seems to intrigue
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Bloom the most is Nietzsche. Nietzsche saw that the
spirit of philosophy-its will to truth-had turned
against human life. He saw what really ailed the modern world: too much Socrates and, as a result, not
enough courage and not enough faith . Culture or
human community is rooted in a shared sense of the
sacred, and nothing is sacred in Socrates' eyes.
Nietzsche attempted to revive, using Aristophanes'
acute criticisms, the case against Socrates. He attempted to create, out of the nothing the West was about
to become, a culture worthy of human beings, including philosophers, by redefining philosophy as creativity.
Nietzsche failed. He did not overcome but only intensified the sickness of relativism. It has become even
more the case that nothing is sacred. The lesson to be
learned, according to Bloom, is that philosophy is not
fundamentally creative. The efforts of thought to invigorate action by subordinating itself to it, as the extreme case of the early Nazi Heidegger (Nietzsche's
best student) showed, produce perverse, destructive,
and, ultimately, ridiculous results. Heidegger and
Nietzsche, according to Bloom, were not ironic
enough.
Bloom is plenty ironic. He is too much so to strike
out against Socrates himself. He goes through the case
against Socrates with the attitude of a prosecuting attorney on the public payroll, not with passionate, personal conviction. The only thing that matters to him is
that philosophy have a future . He leaves it to others
to teach today's students how to be parents, citizens,
and Christians or Jews under the circumstances they
encounter. He creates the false and debilitating impression, in fact, that such "commitments" are no
longer possible.
The most striking omission from Bloom's book is a
real appreciation of the case for revelation. He gives
no evidence that he reads the Bible as he says it must
be read, "with the gravity of a potential believer." In
this respect, at least, he is no different from his
cousins and the characteristic, contemporary, closedminded American professor.
Bloom never discusses, for example, St. Augustine's
biblically-based criticism of the self-deceptive pride of
the philosophers, of their willful inability to see the
true foundation of the freedom of the human person.
He is virtually silent on the biblical-Christian experience of the createdness of the human person, and he
underestimates greatly, I think, the power of this experience in shaping the modern world. He also underestimates, perhaps because of the limited range of his
experience with students, the extent to which the experience of a personal God maintains the reality of
American freedom and democracy even today. For
8

Bloom, as for his cousins, as for Nietzsche, God, particularly the God of the Bible, is dead, and Bloom
does not pretend to be able to create a morally
adequate replacement.
Bloom, the philosopher, can admit in principle that
he may be wrong on God. But he needs to be challenged by teachers and students who really believe he
is. Can it be true that the future of American openmindedness is dependent on teachers who can show
today's students the continuing credibility of the experience of belief, of the creature?
Cl

What the Butcher Knows

"It is an honorable thing to be a dentist's
technician or a butcher, but neither
would claim to be a creator."
-Madeleine L'Engle

How to dismember,
how to separate the fat,
how the muscles stick to the bone
how to detach wings
how to loosen joints
how to smack pink coils into a paper boat.
Every morning he puts on a
freshly starched apron
and unsheathes his knife from the carving block,
he walks through the freezer jostling
sides of beef, setting them moving like
impatient children standing on one
foot and then the other.
He knows about the insides of things,
tucking the neck into the hollow chicken,
stuffing sausages into translucent socks.
Probably also he knows
what to do with feathers,
brains, hooves.
Wrapping packages of prim chops,
he sees beyond today
He knows how things turn out if they
are not snatched up.

Jill Baumgaertner
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ROBERT NISBET'S AMERICA
A Conservative Jeremiad on the Modern Age

For much of his professional career Robert Nisbet
has been a lonely example for those who insist that the
phrase "conservative sociologist" must be something
other than an oxymoron. With The Present Age: Progress and Anarchy in Modern America (Harper & Row,
$17.95) Nisbet has provided further evidence of his
rather isolated status within a discipline overrun byand overpopulated with-Marxists, feminists, and
other assorted utopians. While less a sociological
treatise than an historical essay, The Present Age is pure
Nisbet, if not pure sociology. So much the better for
both.
In fact, Robert Nisbet has long been writing essays
masquerading as full-blown books. The Present Age is
no exception. It is a personal statement of his untempered objections to the century during which it has
been his misfortune to be alive and thinking. The Present Age, however, is not an exercise in presentism. According to Nisbet's definition, the age extends at least
from the Great War to, well, the present.
As he hurriedly surveys this seventy-year swath of
time, Nisbet finds precious little that pleases him-and
a lot that doesn't. Too old to be an angry young man,
he is too angry to be a contented old man. Instead, he
is an example of another rare bird in full fight : the
angry old man. Not one but two previously oxymoronic pairings collapse when confronted with the not
always pleasant persona and not always pleasing
thoughts of one Robert A. Nisbet.
We might expect that Nisbet would be less the curmudgeon today than he was prior to the arrival of a
conservative administration in Washington. Morning
in Ronald Reagan's America, one would think, could
not have failed to brighten at least some of the recently present days for his conservative. In two words,

John C. Chalberg, a new contributor, teaches American
History at Normandale Community College in Bloomington,
Minnesota.
November, 1988

however, it did. Why? Not because the Reagan revolution failed, but because Nisbet's idea of a revolution
was never considered, much less attempted.
Robert Nisbet is a conservative with a small "c," who
believes in community with an equally small "c."
Nineteenth-century America, or better yet, America at
any point before the Wilson Revolution which accompanied the American entrance into World War I, did
have, in Nisbet's view, a genuine sense of community
with a small "c." There was, Nisbet cannot avoid
suggesting, an American Golden Age which preceded
the present age. There was a time when local interests
prevailed over national interests, when family life was
vibrant, when neighborhood was more than a sociological construct, when bureaucracy did not threaten to
strangle us, and when the demands of the garrison
state were not such that it stood to destroy those
whom it would protect.
Whether those who lived during Nisbet's designated
time of few troubles thought they were so blessed is
beside the point. Nisbet simply assumes that the pre1917 world must have been the best of times for its inhabitants, because the post-1917 world has proved to
be the worst of times for those so unblessed as to be
alive and struggling during this present age.
Nisbet offers no history of American life before
Woodrow Wilson other than to borrow at will from
Tocqueville's observations on the state of life in essentially stateless America, circa the 1830s. Tocqueville,
however, is less important to Nisbet for his sociological
insights than for his predictive powers. It was Tocqueville, after all, who not only detected the seemingly
contradictory American commitments to individualism
and equality, but who warned his American readers
that a powerful federal government would be the inevitable-and ironic--consequence of our desire to
preserve the former and achieve the latter.
Nisbet, the communitarian, is not a spokesman for
the alleged virtues of the self-reliant individual of
nineteenth-century American mythology or for the
supposed vices of the "loose individual" of his version
9
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of twentieth-century American reality. And Nisbet, the
conservative, is no proponent of the virtues of a
thoroughly egalitarian America, much less of government efforts to produce it. To this extent he is in sympathy with the alleged intentions of the Reaganites
and their criticisms of earlier American politicians and
thinkers who built and defended the omnipresent
state. Alleged? Yes, insofar as Nisbet is concerned,
since he doubts that they possessed either the historical sense or political will to effect the kinds of changes
he thinks necessary.
Before examining Nisbet's wish list or his rogues'
gallery of American villains let it be revealed that his
ideological enemies list is headed by a Frenchman, one
].]. Rousseau. Architect of the "most powerful state to
be founded anywhere in political philosophy," it was
Rousseau who laid the groundwork for the modern
despots who have used the rhetoric of freedom and
community to legitimize both their hold on power and
themselves as the personal embodiments of Rousseau's
"general will."
Nisbet finds incipient Rousseaus scattered across the
American political landscape, but he more precisely locates them on the left wing of the American political
spectrum. From Woodrow Wilson to Franklin
Roosevelt to Mario Cuomo there is, in Nisbet's view, a
disturbing pattern of Democratic leaders willing to put
forth the dubious idea of a national community at the
expense of more legitimate local communities in all
their great variety. Nisbet is equally appalled by the dimensions of Wilson's "war state," by the intrusions of
Roosevelt's New Deal state, and by the distortions of
Cuomo's rhetoric in defense of the state as family. At
first glance the current occupant of the New York
statehouse might not deserve to be ranked with his fellow governors, but Nisbet would insist that Mario
Cuomo is of a piece with them. His use of the "family"
metaphor in his much-celebrated 1984 Democratic
keynote address to redefine what Nisbet deems to be
the "centralized, collectivized, and bureaucratized" national state is, to Nisbet, loose and dangerous talk.
So is the willingness of his fellow Americans to buy
it. But one wonders at this point why Nisbet should be
so surprised by these developments. After all, if the
idea of a national community "burns brightly in the
American consciousness at the present time," it is not
the result simply of misguided policies put in place by
a few overly zealous Democratic presidents or presidential pretenders. True, Wilson did tip his hand
when he intoned that it is a "nation, not an army that
we must shape and train for war." But it is also true
that Wilsonian repression did not stem solely from the
White House; it came as well from the herd-like voluntarism of thousands of "neighborhood watchers,"
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four-minute men, and textbook censors.
In any case, the newly-aroused attachment to the
state did not disappear during the less than normal
Twenties. To Nisbet, this was not an era of a restored
normalcy, but rather a time of nationalizing constitutional amendments (prohibition and women's suffrage), of Hoover-inspired national planning in everything from agriculture to social work, and of the continuing popularity of such nationalist thinkers as John
Dewey (whom Randolph Bourne ridiculed as a "war
intellectual" and whom Robert Nisbet disparages as a
leading example of a then new and now permanent
phenomenon, namely the "political intellectual"). Why,
even Ronald Reagan's favorite non-statist chief executive, Calvin Coolidge, comes in for the Nisbetian glare
for turning the Bureau of Investigation over to one].
Edgar Hoover with "clear instructions" to convert it
into the "first federal police force in American history."

Nisbet finds incipient Rousseaus
scattered across the ideological
landscape, but he more precisely
locates them on the political left.
But the soon-to-be FBI subsequently proved to be a
very small cog in a Cold War machine which Nisbet
finds indefensible from a military, intellectual, or
moral standpoint. Here Nisbet wants to have it both
ways. After establishing his anti-Communist credentials, he proceeds to tear apart the official rationale for
the Cold War and the defense establishment which
supports it. The Soviet Union, he concedes, may be a
"highly militaristic, imperialistic nation," but its existence alone cannot explain why the United States has
become a militarized, imperial power as well. (Nisbet
is careful not to employ such loaded words to describe
Cold War America, but the thrust of his argument
nevertheless forces him in that general direction.)
Why, then, does the United States possess an "everlarger" military? Here Nisbet resorts to the twin evils
of that old war horse, the "military-industrial complex," and a recurring Wilsonian impulse which seems
to have infected virtually every American, save Robert
Nisbet, at one time or another. "The Soviets just won't
pass muster as the cause of everything . . . that we
have on our post-World War II record." Our meddling ways are inevitably roo~ed in our tendency to
sacrifice our national interest to national morality. And
our failures are invariably attributable either to a
bloated military or to our acceptance of the "Great
American Myth" (which Nisbet describes as a "can-do
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attitude" when it comes to military engagements, an
attitude which itself doesn't pass Nisbet's muster given
his insistence that the American people are at best uninterested and at worst incompetent when it comes to
carrying out military enterprises).
In the final analysis Nisbet must be labeled a conservative isolationist of the Robert Taft variety. One
would have thought that post-1945 Soviet behavior
would have been sufficient reason to consign that
phrase as well to the permanent status of the
oxymoronic. But Robert Nisbet is apparently nothing
if not a continuing series of contradictions, and
perhaps dangerous contradictions at that. Which, after
all, is worse: a liberal isolationist who argues for a reduced American presence in the world either because
he regards Communism as a progressive force or not
a great threat to western interests, or a conservative
isolationist who claims to understand the evils of Communism, but is more intent upon castigating Washington for over-reacting to this evil?
Writing in the spirit of George Kennan, whom he
invokes but once, Nisbet is spooked by the spectre of
Woodrow Wilson, from whom neither he nor his
country apparently can escape. Wilson's is the "key
mind" governing past and present American foreign
policy. Wilson's "passionate moralism" was the occasion
for the American disaster that resulted from involvement in the Great War.
But if Woodrow Wilson on the American stage was
"pure tragedy," Franklin Roosevelt's longer run was
simple "farce." After 1939 FDR was a "compulsive"
Wilsonian who was determined to bring the United
States into World War II in order to "clean up the
world after the war was won." Wilson had failed to
carry out his crusade, thought Roosevelt, because he
lacked a faithful partner. Enter a nation free from the
taint of imperialism. Enter a wartime ally which had
sacrificed much in the fight against fascism. Enter Stalin's Russia. Enter the farce of an American President
placing his trust in a dictator contemptuous of
Roosevelt personally and the west generally.
Nisbet, of course, is correct to question FDR's naive
strategy. But again he would have it both ways.
Roosevelt's moralizing produced an unholy alliance
with Stalin. Reagan's (pre-Gorbachev) moralizing led
to an excessively anti-Soviet foreign policy-and to a
world divided into the "Good and the Evil"-and to
the "relentless punishment of the (Soviet) Evil by the
(American) Good."
In Nisbet's view Ronald Reagan is the "devoutest
successor . . . to Wilsonianism as interpreted by
Franklin Roosevelt." Like Wilson, Reagan is essentially
a moralist, albeit a "moralist from the right." Nisbet,
however, appears to have little time for moralists of
November, 1988
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any persuasion. There are moralists on the left who
excuse the horrors of Stalinism specifically and Communism generally. There are moralists on the right
who believe that the only enemy America faces is
world Communism. And then there are Nisbetian
moralists who automatically condemn what Charles de
Gaulle dismissed as the universal American "itch to intervene."

In Nisbet's view Ronald Reagan is
the "devoutest successor . . . to
Wilsonianism as interpreted by
Franklin Roosevelt." He too is a
moralist, albeit one from the right.
Robert Nisbet, the anti-moralist, a moralist at heart?
Of course. George Kennan, the realist, a moralist as
well? Right again. And both preach a version of neoisolationism as an antidote to that compulsive American itch. Unlike Kennan, Nisbet does not have to disavow any role he might have played in the creation of
the Cold War American Leviathan. Like Kennan, Nisbet is convinced that the American attempt to manage
"permanent war and a permanent military Leviathan"
will inevitably destroy republican government at home.
So will the "democratic absolutism" of the post-New
Deal state. Here Nesbit's arch-enemies remain Wilson
and Roosevelt. Here Nisbet finds American bureaucracies more pervasive and intrusive than any advanced by a totalitarian state. And here Nisbet extends
his list of those itching to intervene to include the
Reagan White House and the Christian right, determined as they are to insert the "centralized state" into
the "intimacies of the bedroom and the cloister of the
church."
Instead of looking upon the Reagan administration
as a part of the solution to the ills of the present age,
Nisbet is convinced that the dominant strain of American conservatism is very much a part of the problem.
If Reagan is not being accused of acting the part of
an uncloistered Wilsonian, he is taken to task for
thinking that unfettered capitalism is the answer to the
economic and social problems which beset America
and the world. And if Nisbe! is not attacking the Wilsonian urge within Americans, he is disparaging the
"cash nexus" that rules too much of American culture.
To his credit, Nisbet is aware that a bureaucratic
state and free-wheeling capitalism are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Furthermore, he is probably right
to argue that the demands of both produce atomized
citizens or, in his terms, "loose individuals." Instead of
community with a small "c," Nisbet finds a strained na11
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tiona! community filled with free agents of all descriptions. Inspecting the littered landscape from the literal
"free agents" of the professional sports world to the
unhappily swinging singles of the world of America's
other favorite sport, Nisbet can only shake his head in
wonderment over the future of any American community.
And yet this anti-modern pessimist can conclude his
modern jeremiad on a note of unabashed hope. Having traced the decline of community in America, Nisbet takes refuge in his belief that civilizations do not
operate on the basis of "unalterable laws against which
the human will is impotent." Decline there has been,
but the trend which Nisbet both explains and condemns is, lo and behold, not irreversible.
Having found little evidence of individual or collective American willpower, Nisbet calls uoon his fellow
citizens to rediscover their long lost resolve. How are
we to do this? By willpower alone? No. Ideas came
first. Ideas, Richard Weaver once reminded us, do
have consequences. And bad ideas, Robert Nisbet
warns us, have worse consequences, whether the result
is the "monetarization of the human spirit" or the
"trivialization of culture."
But bad ideas can be replaced by a "revolution in
ideas." At least Alexis de Tocqueville thought so and
Robert Nisbet hopes so. According to Tocqueville, a
society is most open to the "great revolutions of the
mind" somewhere between the dominance of an "absolute separation of ranks" and the achievement of the
"complete equality of the whole community." Tocqueville's America was closer to the former when, under
an American caste system, the "imagination
slumber(ed) amid . . . universal silence and stillness
. . . (and) the very idea of change fade(d) from the
mind." Nisbet's America is closer to the latter, but apparently not so close that we are unable to avoid the
ultimate sterility of egalitarianism.
Nisbet finds "manifest revulsion" in America toward
"moralizing militarism," toward "superbureaucracies,"
toward the "cash nexus." The time is ripe, he thinks,
for a revolution in ideas. Americans are not the
fatalists they were before the Great War when it was
common to believe that a "special Providence guided
American success" or when a Bismarck could grumble
that God takes care of drunks, little children, and the
United States of America. Those days are gone, and
they hold no favor for a Robert Nisbet otherwise
awash in the past.
All this is not to say that these present days are
necessarily an improvement. They are not. But this
pause between the torpor of a strictly stratified
America and the demands of a universally egalitarian
America provides Robert Nisbet with a basis for hope,
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if not necessarily grounds for real optimism. In a
sense, Nisbet's surprising conclusion is further evidence of his ability to strike an oxymoronic pose. Is he
a hopeful pessimist or a despairing optimist? Or is he
simply a secret ally of an American isolationist of other
agendas and another persuasion, namely Jesse
Jackson? After surveying the wreckage of the American underclass, Jackson can do little more than shout
"keep hope alive." And after sifting through the debris
left over from too many present days, Robert Nisbet
can only resort to a very similar refrain.
~=

Daedalus
It has as much to do with craft

As anything: feeling the earth
Fade into its casual brown,
Into the sea . ..
The sun centers it all.
There he is, Icarus,
Your other self, winged
And taking the air
As if it were sleep,
As natural as dreams.
What rests there
In the calm flight?
You want to know, following
Suddenly you don't see him.
He's caught in the lightSon, star, sunAnd there's no talking
To him now. How could you,
Fashioning those wings,
Have known about such whiteness,
What it could mean,
The wings free of you?
And then, as if surprised
Or curiously expectant,
He falls
Into the spinning blueness,
A tinier figure
Falling in the still seconds
Of your craftsman's eye.

Kim Bridgford
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American Canon
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
Whatever may be the case in
Sweden, let's say, or Haiti, here in
the United States you cannot take
for granted the veracity of the
writer-the novelist, poet, essayistin interpreting the nation and its
people. Of course you can't take
for granted a lot of other people
either, when you start looking for
the truth: the statistician, the journalist, the cultural analyst operating
inside a think tank, even impressive
fusionists like Christopher Lasch, a
sort of historian/sociologist, and
Michael Novak, a philosopher/
theologian. But at least the Lasches,
Novaks, and Bellahs deal with observed and recorded realities, while
writers are people who make things
up.
Still, we do go to our writers, one
by one, to find things out: to
Fitzgerald for the upper middle
class in the United States in the
1920s and 1930s, and their expensive modes of uneasy play. Whitman for the exuberant mysticism
and materialism that seemed to see
us through the Civil War and

Charles Vandersee, a Valparaiso
University alumnus, is one of the editors of The Letters of Henry
Adams, the last three volumes of which
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beyond. Henry James for pondering how, between Lincoln and
Teddy Roosevelt, everything old in
Europe seemed at first worthy of
great reverence but then finally
deep suspicion.
We never know whether what we
have found out is true, but we feel
they have something to tell us. And
by "we" I mean those few Americans who actually read something
of canonical American literature
besides the one or two semesters
they had in college. Still, a major
literary work was not written to be
studied in college. It usually was
composed to tell a story or reveal a
character, not to express "truths"
about society at large. It's only marginally serviceable as a repository
of useful generalizations.
I take a risk, therefore, in offering one way in which we may
create from literature the "truth"
about America. My notion is that
our impulse to find things out
from literature is warranted and
can be rewarded. Remember that I
am speaking here only of "American" literature-literature of the
United States-and please take for
granted that by "truth" I mean
neither the statistically verifiable
nor an entity arrived at with linguistic and philosophical rigor.
"Truth" does mean certain revelations that a historian of some
breadth and authority would com~
fortably assent to.
This way of putting literature to
use in understanding our own culture--of obtaining some wisdom
even-rests upon a very few pillars,
seven in number:
1. Use works that are "canonical," which is to say works you really ought to read, because they are
interesting, complex, and alive-interesting to people with wellformed minds and alive to the past
and the future as well as the present.
2. From the canon, choose works
in which the writer claims overtly

to be saying something about
"America" or "Americans"-as in
an ambitious title ("The American
Scholar" by Emerson, The American
of Henry James, In The American
Grain by William Carlos Williams,
Americana by Don DeLillo), or in an
unsubtle declaration: "This is an
American story, of the late twentieth century, . . ."
3. Accept such titles as serious
promises and claims; be hopeful
that such declarations indicate a
mind seriously at work. But pay
close attention, in reading, to the
question of fulfillment. That is, a
writer can easily insert a bogus
claim here and there, nudging the
reader to construct more significance than the text warrants. (Saying something is distinctively
"American"
doesn't
necessarily
make it so.) The reader therefore
has to be skeptical of the sententious and watchful for inflation.
Finding explicitly "American" moments in texts, look to see how
(and if) the rest of the story or the
essay really does expand such moments into impressive durations.
4. Draw judiciously on the author's own comments regarding the
work in question-letters, interviews, other writings.
5. Presuppose nothing, when
reading. Leave aside such notions
as the alleged "opposition" of the
American writer to all that is "normal" in American society. Reserve
for later the suspicion that a literary work is excessively subjectivemerely "one man's opinion," and
likely a cloistered opinion at that.
Resist such critical constructs as
"the
American
Adam,"
"the
machine in the garden," "the imperial self," "the reign of wonder,"
"the power of blackness," "regeneration through violence" (some of
the central themes in the American
experience, these proffered by R.
W. B. Lewis, Leo Marx, Quentin
Anderson, Tony Tanner, Harry
Levin, Richard Slotkin).

13

~ ----------~----------~------------------,

6. Keep lists as you go from one
work to another-lists of passages,
merely, until gradually you learn,
from cumulative reading, what
your essential categories of understanding will be.
7. Of greatest importance: Make
connections among the works. Reread works, bringing your later
reading back to them.
What you have here is only
slightly systematic and self-evidently non-rigorous. Also, lamentably commonsensical in an era of
literary studies that "foregrounds"
or "privileges" rather more profound modes of proceeding. An
era also that hesitates to speak of
"truth-seeking."
Still, in the list you can notice
certain premises which will stand
up pretty well, as being neither
quaint nor obsolete nor simplistic.
Canonicity, for example, spares you
the charge of straying into an endlessly contestable "America." However "true" they might be on certain topics or regions, such noncanonical writers as James Michener,
Pearl Buck, and James Whitcomb
Riley will not go far in persuading
a great many people about
"America."
Intentionality (Fenimore Cooper,
let's say, or Thoreau or Dos Passos
or Ralph Ellison claiming explicitly
to be saying something about
"America") may get you in trouble
with critics who think intention
does not exist-that human beings
are generally instruments through
whom language itself does the
speaking, or else instruments expressing ideas that simply happen
to be in the air. But the merit of an
overt, expressed intention is that
you can "unpack" or "deconstruct"
that kind of statement, seeking the
genesis, securing a richness of possible meaning that you may not
find in passages apparently more
casual. Somebody who says "Here I
stand" may have come a long way,
over considerable territory.
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Extrinsic materials show you the
writer's own "unpacking" and extending of the text-the writer trying, with varying degress of candor, to supply a context, reveal
nuances that critics have missed,
confess how personal experience
has helped shape the ideas and
metaphors and views. Henry James'
famous list of what Europe had
and America lacked, in his biography of Hawthorne, is just what
you want in understanding Christopher Newman's French fiancee,
in James' novel The American. To
grasp all the "American" nuances
of Invisible Man, you want Ellison's
Paris Review interview.

Extrinsic materials
show you the writer's own
"unpacking" and extending
of the text-the writer
trying, with varying
degrees of candor, to
supply a context.
Connecting, which is finally the
aim of the whole project, is the
means of dealing with that "one
man's opinion" problem. Crevecoeur (Letters from an American
Farmer) is going to mislead seriously if you conclude on his authority that America is a "melting
pot" where nationalities cannot
help but dissolve. Cather in 0
Pioneers! will help correct, by showing on the Nebraska plains a moreor-less tolerant coexistence of
Swedes,
Norwegians,
Russians,
Czechs, French, Germans, and
Irish, not much dissolved. Henry
Roth, in Call It Sleep, will complicate the question of ethnicity by
showing you an Austrian Jewish
boy on the Lower East Side of New
York bewildered by what Hungarian Catholics worship and terrified
by the Yankee cultural temple
called the Metropolitan Museum of
Art.

Thus, through canonical literature, one "truth" about America
(one of those "categories of understanding") is the permanent question of immigration, acculturation,
and ethnicity. You cannot reduce it
to "melting pot" or "unmeltable"
national groups or benign coexistence. Different regions and different eras show forth varieties of epiermis and dialect, making an ever
mutable society. Neither Crevecoeur nor Cather nor Roth has
got hold of "the truth," but the
canon has. And the canon will
manifest the truth by nuance:
Thoreau's Irish laborers, building
the railroad at Walden Pond, will
become the policemen, saloonkeepers, and streetcar conductors of
Call It Sleep, risen a bit in the
world.
You will have guessed by reference to specific books that the
seven aforementioned pillars support one of those edifices called a
college course. Not in the abstract
am I talking to you, but as a practicing pedagogue. Let me tell you
then what we're reading in the
course this semester, this little enterprise in seeing America "intertextually," as they say.
We start with William Carlos
Williams, In The American Grain
(1925}, one of the few canonical
works that does have as its chief
motive
the
overt expression,
throughout the book, of personal
convictions about the nation and its
people-argumentation, if you will,
takes precedence over narrative.
The New Jersey physician says so
in his Autobiography: "I want to give
the impression, an inclusive definition, of what these men of whom I
am writing [e.g. Columbus, Cortez,
Cotton Mather, Daniel Boone, Ben
Franklin, Aaron Burr, Lincoln]
have come to be for us. That they
have made themselves part of us
and that that is what we are."
Well, he was not inclusive, but he
gets us back to certain beginnings
The Cresset

of "America," and he has the merit
of being interesting: agonized and
polemical. Son of an Englishman
who never became a U .S. citizen,
and of a woman from Puerto Rico,
Williams more than most writers
was genuinely trying to figure out
"America," "the land of my more
or less accidental birth."
We then move into the Revolutionary era with Crevecoeur, the
self-described Pennylvania farmer
(actually a New Yorker), whose
chapter "What is an American?"
provides the most famous definition in the canon. Emerson's
"American Scholar" follows , vigorously rejecting the "courtly muses
of Europe"; then Walden, with
Thoreau's perverse insistence on
"the only true America" as the
place where one is free to do without-without material excess, in
particular. Then some Whitman
poems, followed by James' The
American, one of the classic texts in
which the "New World" turns out
to be Europe. Then Henry Adams'
short novel Democracy (1880), concerned with the natural freedom (or
obligation?) in America to be politically
corrupt and intellectually vacuous.
Cather's 0 Pioneers! takes us
from the venality of Washington
far westward , to remind us that the
nation in the 1880s and 1890s is recently virgin soil as well as a set of
possibly ravished institutions. We're
then in New York City as the new
century starts, following a little
Jewish boy, David Schear!, as he
tries to grapple with the crowds
lately arrived in "the golden land";
this is Henry Roth's Call It Sleep
(1934). We pass over World War I
as such, but see its domestic aftermath through the third volume of
John Dos Passos' U.S.A., called The
Big Money. Then New York City
again, in the late 1930s and early
1940s, with Invisible Man, that impressive tapestry in which Ellison
makes the bold and sucessful effort
not only to display, through
November, I988

nomenclature and allusions, all the
white American cultural heritage
but to show black oral and musical
tradition
woven
inextricably
through it.
We end with the 1985 novel by
Russell Banks, called Continental
Drift ("This is an American story,
of the late twentieth century"),
which reorchestrates much of what
we've seen from earlier generations. It extends the vexed question
of immigration and acculturationour hero, Robert Dubois is French
Canadian in ancestry, involved in
smuggling Haitian refugees into
Florida, which has replaced the
West as the locus of the American
Dream, at least for the Caribbean
oppressed. There's the perennial
American question of whether the
common man can be a good man ,
a man large enough to deal with
"America." "Bob wants to be a
good man." There are new ramifications of the classic American
irony: what you came to America
and hoped for ("those gold-paved
streets") is often not what you
found .
Well, anyway. Some time I'll return to this subject-especially to
explain how it is I'm bold enough
to canonize a novel of our own dec-

ade. But at least you have some indications, if not fully realized argument, about how one gets the
"truth" about "America" in American literature. You extract a small
canon from the big canon, and
then place trust in both aggregation and nuance. You may find
Williams wildly erratic (he hates the
Puritans), but when you get to the
admirably level-headed Cather you
realize how true he is on one of his
emphatic points: Americans have
generally wanted to dominate the
earth rather than accept the soil
and the seasons on their own
terms. Finding Cather working out
the same proposition pushes you
back to Williams to watch him
more closely, seeking nuances, just
as Ellison's final insistence on "possibility" as the chief American fact
makes you think back and suddenly
realize that, yes, that is what all the
others were saying too.
The truth is that truths evolve as
you read with deliberation and
draw the connections. The future
of America is right there. Our writers have made it up for you. With
American confidence you can study
it and know what to expect.
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,

c.v.
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The Mythography
Of Television
James Combs
It is common to think of television as an inherently unstable institution. For those who follow the
vicissitudes of TV-the rise and fall
of shows, the fifteen minutes of
celebrity, the sudden appearance or
disappearance of local newspeople,
byzantine corporate manuevering,
new channels on cable-this observation seems a truism. An industry
so dependent on popular whim
and fancy , so nervous about attacks
by interest groups and government,
so much a child of vaudeville, is a
branch of show biz that quickly
folds the shell game, girlie show,
and carnival tent before the town
minister and sheriff show up with
the warrant. Television, like all
forms of popular entertainment, is
both bold and cautious, interested
in what it can get away with but
mindful and cautious of the perceived wrath of sponsors, ratings,
and "public opinion."
From one point of view, then,
television is a mercurial and neurotically pragmatic institution that has
made us used to the idea that nothing is sacred and nobody lasts.
Television is acutely aware of the

James Combs is spending this fall on
leave from Valparaiso University, where
he is Professor of Political Science.
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ever-nagging question, what have
you done for us lately? Network
programmers work in a kind of
Colosseum atmosphere, wincing
and setting to work again frantically when the ever-fickle mob
turns thumbs down.
It is true that programmers have
a low opinion of TV audiences, but
then TV audiences have a low
opinion of them. Like Dostoevsky's
Grand Inquisitor, TV has power
only if it can keep providing the
delights of the next auto-daje. If
the flames don't burn as bright and
high as audiences desire, they have
the ultimate power: the channel
changer. Power on TV resides in
remaining in sight; if you are out
of sight, unwatched, you do not
exist. Bishop Berkeley anticipated
television when he remarked that if
I don't see you, you're not there.
But from another viewpoint, television is very stable. It is, after all,
an institution, and institutions are
founded on cultural habit. Even
with the expansion of viewing
choice with cable, there is an astonishing stability to the structure
of the television day, and indeed to
those shows that constantly reappear in rerun. The rerun is the
eternal recurrence of television,
and it deserves our attention for a
moment.
Flip around the channels several
times during a typical day. The
familiar icons are there, floating in
the interstices of the TV schedule,
like poltergeists conjured at a
seance. True, these programs are
cheap, they are "filler," they are
not prime time; but they are
watched, they are venerable, they
are the survivors of the history of
television, the huts on the shore
that go on forever right by the torrents of media change.
We know them all intimately,
often in groups: Lucy and Ricky,
Timmy and Lassie, the Kramdens
and the Nortons, Laverne and
Shirley, the 4077th M*A*S*H, the

Cartwrights, Matt Dillon and
friends huddled at the Long
Branch, the Andersons, the Cleavers, the Nelsons, and so on. Shows,
trends, corporate structures, political influences on TV come and go,
but these few remain, Pareto's "residues," seen forever in the platonic
world of residuals.
Thus, I contend, they are important. They would not have survived
so long unless we found something
instructive in them. Reruns have
achieved a certain inviolable status,
like old photographs we pull out
from time to time to savor a memory. Yet more: television now has a
history, and a history creates a
mythology. Reruns are the stuff of
television myth , not only by their
past success, and the nostalgia we
may feel for the time in which they
were popular as prime time, but
also because they are the core of
the mythology of a mass-mediated
world. The canon of popular reruns has achieved mythic status because it describes a sacral universe
of ritual resolutions denied the
present in a time and place that
was at the beginning of the world
we know.
We are all too familiar with the
studies that demonstrate how little
contemporary students know (or
care, but that's another matter)
about history and geography. They
may not know when Columbus discovered
America,
or
where
America is on a map. But I suspect
they have a firm grasp of television
mythography. After all, we are now
into the second generation of
people familiar with television. The
time and place of events or objects
educators find important is outside
of their experience. But the
mythography of TV describes the
world at its beginning, the world
before which, and outside of which ,
there is nothing.
Let us walk through the mythographic world familiar to the children of television. At the core of
The Cresset
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these "places in the mind" is The
Town, the small-town middle-class
neighborhood , populated by the
nuclear family of the post-World
War II bourgeois ideal. This is the
place, the place where we were at
that time supposed to be. The
households of the Nelsons and
Cleavers and Andersons are clearly
antediluvian, even prelapsarian, to
today's teenagers. But they seem
fascinated by such shows : what did
I miss?
Such mythic families possess a
kind of perfection, the sacralization
of the mundane, to be sure, but
nevertheless a place from which we
have fallen irrevocably. Much political rhetoric in the Eighties has
been expended celebrating that lost
world, but like much myth the Fifties' nuclear family is a "Sunday
truth" that is celebrated but not
acted upon. The Town of the
Eisenhower normalcy is a TV myth
of origin from which we have
strayed, and neither the example of
the Reagan family (including
Michael, who thought their black
cook was his mother until he was
eight years old), nor the biblical injunctions of Pat Robertson (who
married his wife in pregnant
haste), nor the "women's duty to
bear children for the glory, and
taxation, of the State" argument of
Ben Wattenberg will likely make
that myth anything more than the
iconography of nostalgia.
The Town of such representative
families is what we might call "general American," homogenous, sanitary, and relentlessly cheerful.
Familial relationships are geometric
in their predictability, and the complications of plot no more threatening than a new gardener who does
silly things or a decision on Saturday morning as to whether to cut
the grass or go golfing. (What did
Ozzie Nelson do for a living?)
The kids are sexless, drugless,
and mindless, three admired traits
that did not subsequently stick. But
November, 1988

then so are the parents: it is impossible to imagine Ward Cleaver
reading a serious book, or Donna
Reed and husband in the throes of
sexual passion, or Jane Wyatt (Mrs.
Jim Anderson of Father Knows Best)
livening up the afternoon wash
with a pitcher of martinis. Such
models of normalcy may strike us
as desirable in the post-Cleaverian
world , but I have a notion that
such an antiseptic model of what
one was supposed to become also
had something to do with rebellion
of the Sixties: one can perversely
imagine the teenage daughter
"Princess" from Father Knows Best
winding up in a hippie commune,
Beaver Cleaver resisting the draft,
or Ricky Nelson dying while
freebasing cocaine.

The kids are sexless,
drugless, and mindless,
three admired traits
that did not stick.
The Town of TV memory is not
entirely homogeneous. On some
run-down old streets, you can find
funky families like the Munsters
and the Addams family. And you'll
find strange people like suburban
witches and genies and Martians,
bachelor fathers and middle-class
families with colorful but wise
maids and butlers. If you venture a
bit out in The Country, you'll find
the rustic folk of Mayberry, RFD,
the charming little hotel of Petticoat Junction, and the rural characters of Green Acres. Solid AngloSaxon stock-apple pies, church socials, slow pace; no Snopeses,
crushing boredom, small town caste
and class, flight to the cities. The
pastoral myth survives on classic
TV as unheroic and silly, but also
with its Aunt Bee certainties and
populist code. The people of The
Town, many of them originally
from The Country, can find inspi-

ration in such a place. They can
point to the example of The Beverly Hillbillies, who retain their vast
fortune in cynical and grasping
Hollywood through their virtues of
ignorance and trust, foiling every
attempt by bankers and other sharpies to outsmart them.
There is, I am sad to say, a dark
underside to the mythography of
television. If we leave The Town,
we come upon The City. The City
is divided into Manichaean factions
of good and evil. Good people live
in apartments and often are in
show business. The Ricardos live in
an apartment; Danny Thomas lives
in an apartment. Later on, nonshow-biz good people would ocapartments
too--Mary
cupy
Richards, Bob Newhart, the Jeffersons. But the City lacked the
simplicity of The Country and the
homogeneity of The Town. Sanford and Son live in a slum, other
Blacks in projects, and Chico works
for The Man. Archie Bunker lives
with his universal prejudices in a
lower-middle-class neighborhood In
Queens (he has since moved to
Yonkers).
However, urban work groupscops, taxi drivers, hospital teamsclosest to the mean streets are usually an ethnic coalition. Occasionally there would be a sit-com with
an ethnic theme (Bridget and Bernie, the latter-day Abie's Irish
Rose), but a glance at the corpus of
Eternal TV reveals strikingly few
such enduring treatments. Even
during the 1970s, with all the talk
about the "unmeltable ethnics" and
the celebration of what Jimmy Carter called "ethnic purity," one
searched in vain for a memorable
TV show about ethnic life. (By contrast, Hollywood has over the
years become bolder about daring
to offend someone in the depiction
of ethnics. Think just of ItalianAmericans: The Godfather epic,
Moonstruck, Raging Bull, Mean
Streets, Priz.z.i's Honor, Rocky, even
17
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Marty.)
And on those TV shows where
there were explicit, or even implicit, depictions of ethnics, there
were often tendencies to "dumb
them down," make them cute or
silly, or appeal to a stereotype. The
Italian on Taxi (Danny DeVito, who
went on to become a truly accomplished comedian), the Pole on
Barney Miller, the Puerto Rican on
Sanford and Son are all dense, the
butt of jokes, and in some ways
representative of some very old
prejudices-Italians are short and
volatile, Poles are dumb (thus the
demeaning Polish jokes), Puerto Ricans talk in fast and unintelligible
Spanish when excited (as for that
matter did Cuban band leaders
such as Ricky Ricardo). The
"Sweathogs" of Welcome Back, Kotter
are a little more subtly drawn, but
still the Italian is darkly handsome,
the Jew supersmart, the Hispanic
and Black streetsmart and tough.
Also located in the The City are
the criminals, those who control the
streets and direct "organized
crime." They typically ride in
stretch limos, consort with beautiful
painted women, and live in penthouses. They are most of the time
vaguely ethnic, often dark-haired
and dark-complected, wearing mustaches and hiding behind dark glasses.
TV villainy is almost always
urban and sophisticated, and indulged in for the crassest of motives. Terrorists, for instance, never
act out of political belief, but from
some personal hurt or desire for
power and wealth. The mythography of The City places this criminal power as virtually ubiquitous,
opposed only by courageous, if
warring, teams in enclosed work
places (St. Elsewhere, Hill Street
Blues). On TV, urban life seems
pretty frantic and scary, what with
all the cops running around shooting and the criminals so powerful,
so it is no wonder that harassed
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urban folks find respites of sharp
banter and strong drink (Cheers).
In many ways, the mythography
of TV to which we are heir in
rerun complements older mythic
depictions and traditions. The
Country bumpkins of Green Acres
are the latest version of the Yankee
farmer, the Appalachian mountaineer, and the Southern redneck
who were the butt of frontier jokes
and were given later life by Ma and
Pa Kettle, the Jeeters of Tobacco
Road, and Li'l Abner. The Town has
occupied a special place in the
American heart since the closing of
the frontier, as evidenced by the
tears still wrung out of audiences
who have seen Our Town. The
Suburb has been the target of
much sociological attack, but not,
as we have seen, on Re-TV. And
The City has long had the popular reputation as an asphalt jungle
that destroyed innocence, morality, and youth.
I am struck by the extent to
which the locus classicus of Rerun
World is centered in The Town, as
amended by the Fifties suburban
ideal. Driving around the country,
one is struck by suburban developments still burgeoning everywhere,
and by how Donna Reed's and
Robert Young's world remains
something of an ideal-a nostalgic
ideal, to be sure, but one that
surely lingers in the backs of our
minds as we sign the mortgage papers. I have long suspected that the
core American bourgeois ideal is
not freedom, but security. The
house, the nice neighborhood, the
kids on bikes, the scrubbed kids
going to church, the safety from
crime and change-the essential
desire is to be secure. The price is
not only familial and financial commitment, but also a certain amount
of conformity that is subtly enforced (though usually not overtly
oppressive). Middle America does
not come to the rerun ideal reluctantly, but willingly. One does not

lose one's individuality, but rather
becomes part of an assimilated class
that accepts affluence and conformity as the fulfillment of the
American quest for achievement
and equality.
Which brings me to what all this
has to do with the price of tea in
China. In the American popular
mind, The Country-either farming, ranching, or the Green Acres
move-is just not a viable option
for most. Suburbia is as much of
the country as most of us want. In
American migratory history, the
country was the place you left to
seek your fortune. But the city to
which many went was rugged and
impersonal, and thus the suburban
compromise was born, between
country and city, with the best aspects of, and access to, both.
But obviously such a universally
admired lifestyle had its price. One
major price was that the mythography favored assimilation, and this
meant that ethnic or racial identity
was to become unstable and unfavored. Once the ethnic leaves the
old neighborhood, goes to work in
the corporate world, marries outside of the national group, and
moves to suburbia, the process of
assimilation into becoming a "general American" has worked its will.
Ethnic pride, speaking the native
tongue, dressing up in native dress,
insisting that the kids marry within
the group--all of this comes to be
seen as a bit silly. Even though
there are religious and other group
pressures to maintain ethnic identification, I think they will all be
defeated by the assimilative processes we associate with suburban life.
This is something that has been
at work for a long time, but rerun
TV has surely given it mythic impetus. The suburban ideal inevitably includes the norm of "deethnicizing." It is still striking to
meet a suburban family with the
embarrassing presence of the immigrant grandmother who speaks
The Cresset

no English, where the father has
married outside the ethnic group,
become an Episcopalian in a suburban church, refused to let the kids
learn the native tongue, and
Anglicized the family name. (In
that regard, one does not see the
Andersons or Nelsons celebrating
their Swedish heritage, nor the
Cleavers tracing their roots to Germany, nor even the Kramdens and
Nortons belonging to the Sons of
Hibernia.)
Recall perhaps the most ethnic
character in the world of rerun:
Danny Thomas. Even Danny, for
all the self-deprecating jokes about
being Lebanese, was patently "general American," and to prove it, the
show would trot out by contrast his
very unassimilated uncle-heavy accent, European clothes, strange
habits and responses, chauvinistic
attitude toward women, emotional
impulses. Danny, like so many
other such characters in American
culture, was saying simply: if you
want to be a real American, lose
the hyphen. Adopt a name as nondescript as Danny Thomas. And
marry a Nordic-looking wife. After
a while, being Lebanese is just a
joke without any onus, and you can
easily get into the country club.
This impulse in American culture is currently salient, it seems to
me, because of the most astonishing development of the 1988 election. This is the Pledge of Allegiance issue that George Bush has
used brilliantly against Michael
Dukakis. Dukakis may have made
the fatal mistake of seeming too
ethnic, too much of The City, Europe, and the old neighborhood.
Perhaps he (and his Jewish wife)
appear unassimilated, and thus
vaguely unAmerican, to many voters, including those who have abandoned much of ethnicity in the
move to suburbia and bourgeois respectability.
Somehow he has not taken the
symbolic "pledge" to become a
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general American, despite the
house m Brookline, the snow
blower, and the kids in college. In
an assimilative culture, ethnic exoticism has become suspect, and thus
in a presidential candidate connotes
an alienness that is "disloyal," or at
least not part of the general American contract so many in Middle
America have made. Dukakis' defeat, then (this is written well before the election), would signal
many things, not the least of which
is that open ethnic identification is
a major disqualification for power
and certainly a barrier to full social
acceptance. This is nothing new,
but such a development suggests
criteria for patriotism that will not
be lost on people with funnysounding names.
So then, Father does Know Best.
Now we know what Ozzie Nelson
did for a living, and why Donna

Reed thought herself such a lucky
girl. June and Ward are "natural,"
not conventional, since myth transforms the conventional into the
natural. All of us general Americans are "naturalized" and the only
-ism we believe in is "Americanism"
(what other country would make
nationalism into an ideology? Or,
for that matter, what other country
would appropriate two continents
for its nationalism, when what we
have is strictly a "United Statesism"?).
We can see the original ritual
enactment of our enchanted world
in rerun, and many of us will seek
to make that TV myth come true
for us. The only question I have is,
as George Bush leads us endlessly
in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance,
I wonder if we are pledging allegiance to a country that doesn't
exist.

••
••

Blessed Secretary
You keep the secret,
like a letter tucked under your sash,
in the office where you rummage
through documents, files, odds
and ends. Yet behind the sash
you hid the memo, preserved the peace.
No one sensed the odd
shift in your eyes. You lost sleep;
still, no one spied the piece
of paper below your breasts. Mum,
you secluded the news, let it sleep,
until refining word from page.
The word you collected stays mum
like your lips pursing the Secret;
you cloister embers and page
mystery where no one will rummage.

Yvonne B. Robery
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Listening to
History?
linda C. Ferguson
The occasion of hearing a work
of great historic significance raises
anew some basic issues of musical
aesthetics.
Is a composition great because of
its position in an historic context,
either in the life of the maker (as
one might claim for the Eroica
Symphony) or in the life of his culture (as one could argue for L e
sacre du printemps)? Is a work great
because it is understood to convey
extra-musical meaning which is important, or which was important at
one time? Is a tradition of cultural
esteem for a work sufficient to account for its greatness to the modern concert-goer? Is it enough to
just be present when Beethoven's C
minor Symphony brings Fate
knocking (again) at the door?
Whose door? Beethoven's door,
long ago answered ? Or our door,
still to be dealt with?
Does the work speak directly to
the audience, or is its value that it
spoke to many others before us for
whom we are presumably standins? Does our perception of the
work's meaning rely on our knowledge of the work's historical bag-
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gage? Or on our knowledge of the
composer's
individual
circumstances and explicit intentions?
Does one marvel more or less at
the denouement of Don Giovanni if
one tries to explain it as Mozart's
revenge on his father? Does Beethoven's Ninth speak less or more
of brotherhood if we know how
unbrotherly Beethoven was most of
his life? And if we don't know, are
we more or less susceptible to the
expressive values of the composition?
The questions multiply when a
performance of the work claims its
own historic significance. One wonders, is this a "great performance"
because of its association with the
"great work"? Or because the special event increases the chances that
either the musicians or the audience (or both) will rise to the occasion? Or because of the reputation
of the performers? Or because,
rather, it projects the expressive
form of the work in so dynamic a
way that the work transcends its
claim to "historical importance"
and claims instead a vitality that
speaks to the audience as themselves, not as imaginers of past
times and circumstances. (I choose
the last as the most appropriate option, that being the only one where
it matters if you listen to the music,
and it is toward this conclusion that
this essay moves.) Such thoughts
occupied me when, on the longest
night of the summer just past,
Leonard Bernstein conducted Shostakovich in Chicago.
Not since 1951 had Leonard
Bernstein appeared on a regular
subscription concert with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. His
series of appearances in Chicago in
June included a concert prepared
under his supervision showcasing
three young conductors and two
performances of Shostakovich's
Symphony No. 7 with Bernstein
himself conducting. (The concert
was taken a few days later to Avery

Fisher Hall in New York; the Chicago performances were taped by
Deutsche Grammophone for future
commercial release.) Bernstein had
for a year or so been even more in
the public eye than usual, in part
because of the appearance of the
sensational and unflattering biography by Joan Peyer (B ernstein: A
Biography, Morrow, 1987) and in
part because of his approaching
70th birthday, celebrated widely
and musically this past August.
Shostakovich's Symphony No. 7
(called "The Leningrad Symphony") occupies a distinctive place
in world history, and its score
comes with extensive baggage.
Whatever else it is, the Leningrad
Symphony is an historical document whose extra-musical associations are alluded to every time it is
mentioned and detailed every time
it is heard, and with good reason,
for it is a thrilling story.
Briefly,
Dmitri
Shostakovich
(1906-1975) was residing in his native Leningrad when, in July, 194 1,
Hitler's forces laid seige to the city.
Shostakovich volunteered for the
military on the first day of the invasion but was rejected due to poor
eyesight and on grounds that he
could serve the national interest
better as a composer than as a soldier. Nevertheless he served as a
volunteer firefighter during the air
strikes, and a photograph showing
him in this action was widely circulated and published in American
news magazines. Carl Sandburg
commemorated
the Image m
"Dimitri Shostakovich":
Sometimes as a firewarden you run to
the streets and help put out the fire set
by Nazi Luftwaffe bombs. Then you
walk home and write more music.

In September, as the seige wore
on (it would eventually last 900
days and kill nearly a million
Leningrad citizens), Shostakovich
began a symphony he envisioned as
The Cresset
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a tribute to the courage of those
enduring and resisting in his city.
With three movements of the work
finished in late September, Shostakovich and his family were ordered to leave the city for refuge in
Kuibyshev, where a number of
other artists were staying. There in
December he completed the final
movement. The premiere was performed in March, 1942, by the orchestra of the Bolshoi Theatre, the
members of which had been
evacuated there as well. The Moscow premiere followed shortly and
met with a standing ovation despite
the air raid alerts that persisted
throughout the performance.
In the United States, the symphony was "a hit" before a note of
it was heard. The demand for an
American performance called for
yet another romantic intrigue: the
score was copied onto microfilm
and smuggled from Moscow to
Teheran by plane, then by auto to
Cairo, by plane to Casablanca, then
to Brazil and finally to the United
States. American conductors scrambled to be the first to program it,
despite having neither heard it nor
seen the score. Toscanini won out,
performing it with the NBC Symphony in a radio broadcast heard
by millions in July, 1942. (It was
first played by the Chicago Symphony a month later at Ravinia.)
The 1942-43 concert season saw
the work programmed sixty-two
times in the United States. Clearly
it established itself on the basis of
its circumstances. This does not
suggest the work lacked intrinsic
musical value, or that this musical
value was ignored, but it is hard to
imagine a listener, American or
Soviet, in that first season of its
hearing responding to its musical
content apart from its political
agenda.
The memory of the hardship,
sorrow, and courage at Leningrad
is not immediate for many listeners
today and is supplanted in the
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minds of others by more recent instances of hardship and valor.
Music for "propaganda" purposes
is now culturally suspect, and
Americans and Soviets no longer
share a political or artistic vision.
What does this mean, then, for
the values and meanings of the
Leningrad Symphony? That it remains in standard repertoire testifies to musical as well as topical
interest. But is this work distinctive
in its relating of life experience to
music?

Bernstein himself has
made a useful distinction
between programmatic
works with "narrativeliterary meanings" and
those with "atmosphericpictoral meanings."

It has been noted that this is the
first major work about warfare actually written during the struggle.
It is not a biographical work growing from the artist's sorted-out impressions after the event. Although
Susanne Langer's distinction be
tween symptom (indicative of "how
one feels") and symbol (articulating
"what one knows of feeling") still
holds, the "lag time" between experience and transformation of the
experience into artistic form was, in
this case, unusually compressed.
Even more remarkable is the ultimate victory suggested in the
finale, composed at a time when literal victory was by no means certain. Thus the work is no simple
reflection on life experience in an
historical context.
I do not know of anyone who
seriously believes anymore that
music, apart from texted works and
specifically
contrived
performances, can convey or represent
political ideology. Although a

Platonic tendency has characterized
Marxist thought about music and
although music can certainly be
used in service of political and social causes, it does not seem appropriate to argue that the Leningrad Symphony's meaning is essentially political. One might well
argue that its style is "nationalistic"
in the nineteenth-century sense,
but even as I listened to the "giant
steps" of the openings of movements 1 and 3, I noted that the
"Wide Spaces of Our Land" could
as well refer to our land. (The
opening of the third movement, in
particular, sounds like Aaron Copland "describing" the American
west.)
Whether or not the Leningrad
Symphony has a "program," a literary or pictoral set of images intended by the artist to be associated
with the music, remains a point of
controversy since the composer
both embraced and rejected such
suggestion. This issue is related to,
but not the same as, the matter of
the work's historical value. The
original titles for the movements,
"War,"
"Remembrance,"
"The
Wide Spaces of Our Land," and
"Victory," were replaced by the
time of the first performance by
brief descriptive phrases retaining
the program for movements 1 and
4 but focusing more on the qualities of the second and third movements (lyricism and drama) than on
concrete imagery. In so choosing,
the composer made the first move
to disengage the work from complete dependence on its historical
context.
Bernstein himself has made a
useful distinction between programmatic works with "narrativeliterary meanings" and those with
"atmospheric-pictoral
meanings."
Further, he recognizes "affectivereactive meanings" ascribed to
music (a complex category of
meaning, since it implies a successful communicative transaction be-
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tween composer and listener) along
with "purely musical meanings ,"
which interest him (and most
other musicians) most but which
are considerable trouble to explain.
Although I do not know of any
verbal account of Bernstein's interpretation of the work, I believe
that his exploration of meaning in
the Leningrad Symphony would
refer to the program only in passing. His writings include a delightful dialogue ("What do you mean,
Meaning?")
between
himself
("L.B.") and another character,
"Lyric Poet." In it he recognized
two fundamentally different approaches to musical semantics, and
although he allows the Lyric Poet
to have the final word, he pokes his
fun at those who must have names
for their "sonorous forms in motion." In that dialogue he assigns to
the Lyric Poet the clearest statement of his own belief: " . .. words
have their original function in representation, and are transparent;
and notes have their original function in abstraction, and are
opaque."
I do not know what was in LB.'s
mind as he interpreted the work in
performance, but I do know that I
paid close attention for the full
hour and a half, and that when it
was over I knew the work's value
had been revealed as essentially
musical. When the famous march
tune intruded in the first movement, first innocently in the distance, then menacingly in the
foreground,
then maddeningly
through more than ten minutes of
incessant repetitions, it never QCcurred to me to imagine Nazi
troops goose-stepping. I was not
alive when Leningrad was besieged.
My historical knowledge is indirect
and academic. I am free of the
"necessary" historical reference
which this work has carried.
I was struck, in retrospect, at
how little "program" and know!-
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edge of history are necessary to
comprehend the composer's expression of despair as Bernstein
drew it out: mechanistic forces
wreaking havoc with the natural organic process of the first movement
sonata form; bittersweet remembrance of contentment interrupted
by a distorted , wicked trio in the
second; and ehe triumph of the
human spirit, reflecting not "what
one knows of triumph," but how
one hopes it will feel even as the
marks of struggle still show.
These qualities, the vital import
of the work, began in specific circumstances,
but
those
circumstances are now insufficient to
explain the music's vitality. The
work can no longer be tied exclusively to them. This is not to argue
that a musical work "means what
the listener wants it to mean," but
that its capacity for meaning is best
specified in terms of qualities and
shapes of experience rather than in
the particulars of the experience
themselves.

A N ewsweek quip recently noted
that "Leonard Bernstein is almost
as famous for what he says as what
he plays." While that statement
may describe a fact, the fact is inconsequential, for what Bernstein
says and what he plays are the
same thing. In this he seems
worthy to be described by his own
definition of compositional excellence (from another dialogue,
"Why Beethoven?") ". . .the power to
make you feel at the finish: something is right in the world. This is
something that follows its own law
consistently: something we can trust,
that will never let us down.''
Bernstein
has
been
much
criticized musically as well as personally. Michael Walsh of Time sees
in his "exaggerated gestures and
lugubrious tempos" a parody of his
earlier more brilliant and incisive
self. The same charge can be levelled against all of his published
prose work. In graduate school I
gave away my copies of his books.
They seemed disorderly, unschol-

Driving the Rush Hour after Work
Kicking the brakes, I think how simple
it seemed, digging postholes
around four sides of a pasture,
caliche and sand easy to slice
six inches at a time, then bedrock
I 't ook a steel rod to and battered
until it broke, and pried out pieces
like a tooth. Always in childhood
the same hole , easier to fill
than to dig, tamping the bar down
around the post, bulls butting
the tight barbed-wires for years.

Walter McDonald
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arly, unprofessional, full of hyperbole and firing for effect.
I now see they are not books at
all, but collections of lesson plans.
Their lack of "professionalism" is
rather their attempt to reach those
who are not experts. Their lack of
scholarship is rather the attempt to
share what any good teacher provides: insights rather than encyclopedic information. A self-appointed popularizer of the works
and issues of the fine art concert
tradition, he does not resort to a
superficial packaging of his wares.
His aim is not to make more
people buy music but to make
more people understand it, and
understanding music is an untidy
business.
In a presentation at my first important interview for an academic
position, I applied Bernstein's linguistic and rhetorical theory of musical process to a passage from a
Schumann piece. I got the job, and
immediately bought new copies of
all his books. (Leonard Bernstein in
absentia has been teaching my
classes for years.) His active role in
the larger conversation about the
nature, functions, and meanings of
music in human life is at least as
important to contemporary American audiences as his compositions,
and if he has employed hyperbole
as a conductor, he is only doing
what we teachers do when we are
desperate to be understood.
John von Rhein of the Chicago
Tribune wrote of the Shostakovich
concert that it "sent the audience
home on . . . a tidal wave of
euphoria, and for so many of the
right reasons." Surely he did not
mean that everyone had contemplated a single historical event.
History lessons, even stirring ones,
could hardly be expected to produce such a result. The vital import
of that work spoke to us far more
musically, and hence, directly, with
Bernstein as the composer's advocate.

••
••

November, 1988

Explosion in

The Zone
Richard Maxwell
Not many people liked Empire of
the Sun. Maybe we were all too busy
rushing out to catch Bernardo Bertolucci's admirable but evasive Last
Emperor. Maybe Emperor and Empire
simply shared too much-spectacle
scenes shot within (see it now!) the
mysterious East; war pageants of
devastating futility and horror
viewed by children who had been
separated from their parents; aspirations to epic scope and epic
length. Two such movies in one
season-three, if we add John
Boorman's smaller scale Hope and
Glory-may have been too many.
When doppelgangers meet, one of
them must die. Emperor rode to
glory or at least to the Academy
Awards; Empire was left behind,
prostrated.
If we want some sense of Empire's distinctive accomplishment,
we must recognize the narrative
tradition that lies behind it (and
that distinguishes it, largely, from
works like The Last Emperor--despite the similarities mentioned
above). Along with his screenwriter,
the British playwright Tom Stop-
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pard, Steven Spielberg worked
from J. G. Ballard's novel-memoir,
also titled Empire of the Sun. Ballard
is a British science-fiction writer
who has produced some striking
novels about anomie in urban settings; Empire develops a related
theme autobiographically and historically.
According to its author, the book
"describes my experiences in
Shanghai, China, during the Second World War, and in Langhua
C.A.C. (Civilian Assembly Centre),
where I was interned from 1942 to
1945." The subject is in one way
familiar. There have been many
other
semi-fictional
narratives
about disoriented victim-observers
wandering through World War II,
a number of them rather effective.
Empire goes a step further, however; it connects this attractive (if
easily exploitable) subject with the
lore of the Zone.
The Zone was discovered long
before anyone thought to call it
that. One of its earliest appearances
is in Sir Walter Scott's Talisman,
where a passel of Crusaders encamped on Syria's sands attempt to
comprehend the diplomatic-military maze where they find themselves. Scott imagines a world of
overlapping cultures, traditions,
and languages, a world not quite at
war but not at peace either. Crucial
political settlements are held in
abeyance; for the moment, anything is possible. Under these
charged circumstances it becomes
difficult to tell the difference between Christian and Moslem, Englishmen and Scotsmen, sanity and
madness.
The historical novel-so often
concerned with the fate of discrete
nation-states-thus takes a rather
different tack than in Scott's earlier
work. It becomes an international
genre: marked by the dissolution of
familiar boundaries (both cultural
and geographical); in the absence
of these boundaries obsessed with
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the wildest utopian or dystopian
speculations; haunted, despite an
apparent lack of constraints, by immediate, contingent, often quite
deadly circumstances.
There are other accounts of the
Zone in the nineteenth century;
however, not until after World War
II does it really flourish as a subject. We can encounter versions of
the Zone in a number of important
works from the last forty years or
so, all of them-more or less-historical novels, all of them following
something like the model of The
Talisman. John Cowper Powys'
Porius (1951) has never achieved
the wide readership it deserves, but
in retrospect looks like a defining
instance for postwar literature.
Gunter Grass' Danzig Trilogy
(about a "Free City" straddling several ambiguous borders), Gabriel
Garcia Marquez's Hundred Years of
Solitude,
Edward
Whittemore's
Quin's Shanghai Circus as well as his
later Jerusalem Quartet, Pynchon's
Gravity's Rainbow, and perhaps portions of Michel Tournier's The Ogre
explore various aspects of this
topic. (So do the gargantuan canvasses produced by the painter Anselm Kiefer, current darling of
American art critics.)
It is Pynchon who names the
Zone, Pynchon who associates it
most fully with arrangements made
in the wake of the war. Narrowly
speaking, Pynchon's Zone consists
of the occupied zones in Germany.
However, as one street-smart character puts it, "there are no zones
. . . no zones but the Zone." The
narrator of Gravity's Rainbow comments further, "Here in the Zone
categories have been blurred badly.
The status of the name you miss,
love, and search for now has grown
ambiguous and remote, but this is
even more than the bureaucracy of
mass absence-some still live, some
have died , but many, many have
forgotten which they are. Their
likenesses will not serve. Down here
24
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are only wrappings left in the light,
the dark; images of the Uncertainty . . . . "
equivocates
about
Pynchon
whether it is a temporary condition
or the beginning of a dispensation
in which we still find ourselves. In
either case, the Zone offers unique
opportunities of knowledge. Because the workaday framework of
national sovereignty is suspended
here, because old fictions have
been obliterated or neutralized
without new arrangements Immediately hardening in place,
forces that would normally remain
hidden are exposed ; we can talk
about realities that would otherwise
remain unspeakable.

So long as he is
protected by British
dominance, Ballard's
young protagonist Jim
need not confront the
Zone-like qualities of
the city & its environs.
Ballard
shares
with
other
chroniclers of the Zone the desire
to present a moment when politics
and society as normally understood
have collapsed. Empire begins,
"Wars came early to Shanghai,
overtaking each other like the tides
that raced up the Yangtze and returned to this gaudy city all the
coffins cast adrift from the funeral
piers of the Chinese Bund." The
Bund-to quote a 1935 guidebook
-is "the muddy tow-path of fifty
years ago which has magically become one of the most striking and
beautiful civic entrances in the
world. "'
'All About Shanghai: A Standard
Guidebook, with an introduction by
H.J. Lethbridge (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1983, first
published by the University Press,
Shanghai, 1934-1935).

This booster-prose contains some
truth. There can be few riverfronts
more impressive than Shanghai's.
However, it is not the Bund as a
whole of which Ballard is writing.
Just north of the original walled
city, at the junction of the
Hwangpoo and Woosung Rivers
(the Yangtze is actually some miles
from the site), the English built
their own compound. The French
and the Americans followed suit.
These foreign sectors had near-autonomy from Chinese Shanghai.
Shanghai as it existed during the
early twentieth century was thus a
group of semi-independent cities
clustered together for the overriding purpose of trade.
It was the English Bund, the English riverfront, where civic display
flourished most lavishly. The
Chinese Bund was much further
down the social scale. As Ballard
tells us later on (he keeps returning
to those gathering corpses, much as
they keep returning to the funeral
pier), the reason behind the custom
of casting bodies adrift was monetary. The funeral pier was for
those who could not afford to bury
their dead. Shanghai became a
town built upon unusually violent
economic contrasts; the disruptions
implicit in the structure and purpose of the city began to make it a
Zone even before the Japanese invasion of 1939: the "striking and
beautiful civic entrance" opens up
that territory of Uncertainty where
life and death will mix in unanticipated ways.
So long as he is protected by
British dominance , Ballard's young
protagonist Jim need not confront
the Zone-like qualities of his city
and its environs. More precisely, he
can take these qualities for granted,
register them while suppressing
their implications. Ballard gives us
one horrible moment when Yang
the chauffeur, driving out of the
gates, directs a magnificent car
somewhat carelessly over the corpse
The Cresset

of a Chinese beggar; Jim looks
back through a polished window
and sees that the corpse's arm has
been severed. 2
Once he has lost his privileged
status-and, almost simultaneously,
been separated from his parentshis apprehension of Shanghai
changes, along with the peckingorder within the city. Jim does not
exactly gain a social conscience. On
the other hand, he learns to make
certain discriminations; he sees
more than he used to, partly because certain facts have become
more obvious (e.g., the Chinese
need no longer mask with deference their hatred of the British),
partly because he is educated by
pain and separation.
The great images of Empire, like
that opening picture of returning
corpses, create a condition of information overload. Jim becomes both
hyperactive and disoriented. Mentally as well as geographically, he
enters the Zone. Because he is
forced to help build an airport runway, just outside the prison camp
where he spends most of the war,
he identifies with the Japanese
pilots who land there. Because he
adapts so well to prison life, he
comes to hope that the war will
never end: Dr. Ransome , one of
2

0ther accounts suggest the frequency-and obvious desperationwith which such indigents would
enter the residential sections of the
British compound, only to be
rounded up by the police and expelled. This tug-of-war between police
and beggars began well before the
twentieth century; the invention of
the motor car made it easier for the
police to disperse the beggars
throughout the country-side, thus
preventing their quick return. There
were generally other beggars to take
their place. For one treatment of this
subject, see Pan Ling, Old Shanghai
(Heinemann, Asia: Hong Kong,
1984), on the early career of Du
Yuesheng. Like Ballard (though
without his extraordinary talent),
Pan Ling writes history in a form
close to the novel.
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the more humane characters in Empire, "resented Jim for revealing an
obvious truth about the war, that
people were only too able to adapt
to it."

Once he has lost his
privileged status-and,
almost simultaneously,
been separated from
his parents-his view
of Shanghai changes.
Ballard dwells on such paradoxes. He uses them as a way into
Jim's most compelling confusion.
Especially after he has left the
camp, herded by the Japanese towards an unstated goal, Jim cannot
determine whether he is dead or
alive. Ballard briefly mentions the
boy's confrontation in the camp
hospital with "a Belgian woman
who had seemed to come back
from the dead." Jim suspects that
his own frenetic attempts to stay
alive "meant no more" than her
seeming· resurrection. Though he
escapes the Japanese march before
it can kill him, his visions of mortality persist. American planes drop
rations from the sky. Jim eats
Spam. "He associated the chopped
ham with those fattened corpses [of
prisoners, swollen by death]. Each
was enveloped in the same mucus.
.. . Food fed death, the eager and
waiting death of their own bodies."
I have not thus far mentioned
the book's ultimate death-vision.
Ballard prepares this moment
through a chain of allusions to
movies. Yang, chauffeur to Jim's
family, works in the Shanghai film
industry. He proves an infinitely
adaptable character, just as malleable as the play of light and sound.
Wandering through Shanghai, Jim
sees an advertisement for Gone With
the Wind, an historical epic quite
different than Ballard's own. Later

Jim is imprisoned in an open-air
cinema which has become a detention camp: the real purpose of the
camp is to nudge as many prisoners as possible into dying quickly
and thus putting less strain on food
supplies. Those who survive are
not released from cinematic tortures. A slowly starving prisoner,
Mrs. Vincent, "stared at the
whitewashed walls above her son's
bunk, as if watching an invisible
film. . . . Jim worried that Mrs.
Vincent spent too much of her
time watching these films."
This sort of reference is recalled
when Jim and his fellow prisoners
are interned within a "concrete
arena . . . built on the orders of
Madame Chiang Kaishek, in the
hope that China might be host to
the 1940 Olympic Games." Here
slogans "hung over the darkness
like the hoardings above the
Chinese cinemas in prewar Shanghai." We are back at the movies.
What we see there first is an allegorical tableau. The prisoners lie
dying from hunger and exhaustion
among a plethora of goods that
have been confiscated from Jim's
own neighborhood (there are
cocktail cabinets, rotting carpets,
fifty or so luxury cars; Jim hopes to
find a prized Studebaker, which
once belonged to a friend of his
father's who is now dying beside
him).
The morning following this appalling scene, the stadium is filled
by light, "as if an immense American bomb had exploded." Lightning, said Jim's governess, was God
taking pictures of Shanghai's wickedness. The atomic bomb dropped
on Nagasaki, whose flash he is in
fact observing, takes one final picture of that debauch. We are faced
with an image whose intensity is
blinding: it is an ending, also a harbinger. The true Empire of the
Sun (neither British nor Japanese)
announces itself. Salvation comes
from the skies, but not just any old
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salvation: "Jim smiled at the
Japanese [guard], wishing that he
could tell him that the light was a
premonition of his death, the sight
of his small soul joining the larger
soul
of
the
dying
world."
War, film, theology, apocalyptic
prophecy, and what Freud called
the death drive are at this moment
fused together. One feels that the
book has been seeking such an intersection, recognizable from earlier accounts of the Zone. It is easy
to suspect that Spielberg too has
been seeking it. Recall: Close Encounters of the Third Kind had its
semi-divine flying saucers present a
nighttime air show-an airshow
where the power of movies and the
power of visiting gods were curiously, one might say perversely,
identified.
Raiders of the Lost Ark went for
the same sort of muddled, groping
climax. The holy ark burned to a
crisp the Nazis who dared meddle
with it. (This scene almost certainly
borrows from the science-fiction
ending of Robert Aldrich's Kiss Me
Deadly, where the atomic bomb is
mythicized into a radioactive Pandora's Box, opened by a femme
fatale heroine. Aldrich, of course,
never asks us to worship the deadly
box; Spielberg does-at least until
he abandons it within the same
warehouse where Citizen Kane's
Rosebud was so memorably incinerated.)
In E.T., most notoriously, the
title extra-terrestrial became a
Christ-figure fallen from the skies.
Here Spielberg worked with a gentler hand than usual, but the dubious identification between holiness
and a miraculous technology focused on lighting-displays persisted.
The special-effects outfit Spielberg
shares with George Lucas is called
Industrial Light & Magic; this same
phrase might well sum up his
career. 3
Empire could easily be read as a
Spielberg-like work, more grist for
26

the same old mill. And so it might
have turned out; the movie could
have looked like just another spectacular from the light-factorybeautiful, confused, and in love
with its own stunning visual impact.
Somehow, though, the project developed differently. I don't want to
highlight any one reason for Spielberg's success; there are a great
number of things that are right
about the film Empire. Nonetheless,
a few are worth singling out. Let
me note several Spielberg preoccupations that-in this new contextare handled much more intelligently than usual as we work our
way towards a glimpse of Nagasaki.
And then we will have some sense
of why that blast is different from
anything in this director's cinematic
past.
One good sign is that Spielberg
and Stoppard (unlike Ballard) are
sparing with references to film. An
early crowd scene is dominated by
the giant Gone With the Wind poster
which Ballard mentions; it looms
over a panicked Shanghai mob, trying to escape a city more perilous
than Margaret Mitchell's burning
Atlanta. Apart from this irresistible
detail, there is little about movies
before the explosion.
Perhaps Spielberg has finally
realized that film allusions within a
film tend to function differently
than film allusions within a book.
The former usually cry out for attention; the latter more easily remain subordinate. We will not be
tempted to suppose that the power
of film and the power of the
1 have not mentioned The Color Purple. It is a special case: in its subject-
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matter twice as interesting as any
other Spielberg film, but abandoned
so fully to its own gushing sincerity
as to negate its considerable virtues.
For a more positive view of E. T.
than the one I express in this paragraph, the reader will want to consult Mark Schwehn's Cresset essay,
"The Reality of E.T.: Meanings and
Misunderstandings" (May, 1983).

atomic bomb are somehow equivalent-even though the analogy between them may help us understand both. Instead, we will be encouraged to focus on matters of
greater import (for example, on
the logic of violence among
Chinese, Japanese, British, and
Americans during each successive
phase of the war: this is a subject
that Ballard handles superbly, especially in a chapter titled "The Eurasian," and Spielberg better than
anyone might have supposed. In
both novel and film, we are given
an intricately-observed social context which prepares us for the violence of the atomic bomb, making
it seem a less singular event than it
often does).

A second encouraging
note: Spielberg has
moderated some of his
dewy-eyed love for
childhood innocence.
A second encouraging note:
Spielberg has moderated some of
his dewy-eyed love for childhood
innocence. Childhood as we conventionally understand it is an invention of the nineteenth century.
It is a construct to which Spielberg
is enormously attracted. (After
E.T., it seemed that he might go on
to make a version of Peter Pan, with
Michael Jackson in the title role.)
Ballard's novel provides a useful
counterweight to this inclination.
Ballard is ruthless about conveying
Jim's . . . originality: for example,
his pseudo-religious admiration of
wartime violence (especially of
Japanese exploits in the air) and his
scorn for British efforts to keep up
some semblance of conventionally
civilized behavior. With one or two
lapses-there are some odd familyof-man moments preaching that if
people were nice, everything would
be OK-Spielberg conveys Jim's
The Cresset

-----point of view without insisting on
the moral superiority or moral
uniqueness of children. And Christian Bale, a young English stage
actor, does superb work as Jim.
A third point. Along with George
Lucas, Spielberg has long been
fond of that irritating figure, the
surly young male adventurer with a
heart of gold. There's an Indiana
Jones type in Empire, but he proves
to be profoundly rotten. (Perhaps I
should say superficially rotten:
there are no depths here to be corrupted.)
The part of Basie is played by
John Malkovich, whom I've somehow avoided seeing in any stage or
screen production. There are times
when Malkovich seems to be doing
his Harrison Ford imitation, but he
achieves a fascinating blankness
which Ford has never matched and
probably isn't capable of reaching.
I should note that Stoppard has
added an incident in which Basie is
humiliated by the Japanese commander of the camp, losing all his
hard-won prison possessions; he
has also added what looks like a
half-developed gay subtext (Basie
abandons Jim for a beautiful blond
boy named Dainty). Neither of
these reviSlons helps or hurts
much, though the first one is more
to the point. Basie is capable of
turning anything (including Jim)
into a commodity. It is his sense of
The market, not his sexual aspirations, if any, that count.•
Fourth, Spielberg's attitude towards technology has never been
more sensibly thought-out than
here. He has always had mixed
feelings about science: it is both a
gateway to the wonders of the cosmos and a sterile dead-end. There
was a problem with this ambivalence. Spielberg seemed to suppose
•Ballard does better here. He notes
that most of the men in the camp
were either impotent or infertile but
that condoms nonetheless were constantly rising in barter value.
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that sCience could be made OK if
only we were persuaded (largely by
cinematic means) to class it with
magic-that is, with visits from the
gods. In Empire of the Sun, this confusion is displaced onto Jim; Spielberg is allowed the possibility of
distancing himself from plane-worship, bomb-worship, etc.
When the film came out, people
quarrelled about whether he had
been able to take this golden opportunity. I think he has, and brilliantly. Like most stories where one
character dominates, Empire tempts
us to mix up author and protagonist. Ballard's third-person but
intimate narration and Spielberg's
dogged concentration on the
frightened, struggling figure of Jim
both push us towards conflating
the adult J. G. Ballard with the boy
about whom he writes.
But only so far. Ballard maps out
certain ways in which Jim is able to
resolve his confusions. We are thus
made aware, in case we're slow,
that he has confusions. Spielberg
makes Jim's energies seem terrifyingly pointless (there is a repeated
notion of going around in circles,
developed with great skill from the
barest textual hint) and at the same
time pitiable. As in Ballard, though
by different means, we are distanced from Jim's semi-fascist
mythologies.
This question of mythology is
central. If I were to sum up the
strength of Spielberg's Empire in
one phrase, I would say that Spielberg shows a new respect for fact.
To make the point more elaborately: where previous Spielberg
films tend to refigure history as
fantasy, this one subordinates the
fantastic to historical truth.
An incident at the film's beginning offers a succinct confirmation.
We see the British elite attending a
masquerade party. They are all
wonderfully
dressed:
pirates,
clowns, what you will, a pageant of
ever-so-elegant dreams. As Jim dis-

covers when he goes out on the
lawn to fly a big model airplane, a
Japanese squadron is encamped
just over the next hill. Spielberg
stages this shock well. He reminds
us here, as throughout his Empire,
that Shanghai was and is an actual
place, that it was shaped by a singular blend of geographical, economic, and cultural arrangements,
and that all of them surfaced-all
became briefly undeniable-at that
moment when the city had to be
experienced as a Zone, even by
people like Jim.

I have identified the
Zone with an ability to
see what normally remains
hidden, to know what
might remain unknowable.
I have identified the Zone with
an ability to see what would normally remain hidden, to know what
might generally remain unknowable. Perhaps the reader will not
need to be persuaded that such an
accomplishment is remarkable. Certainly it is scarce within our culture.
"Facts are stupid things," mis-spoke
a leader whom I will always remember as the. President who went
to Bitburg. On the Left-especially
the literary Left-facts have lost
ground through a different logic: a
puritanical hostility towards art and
rhetoric has encouraged people to
throw out the baby with the bathwater, to suppose that a knowledge
of things as they are is unreachable
through film, painting, fiction, and
so forth. If we study art, therefore,
facts must be quite beside the
point. Most sadly, those who argue
for the power of fact have allowed
the trivialization of their own concerns. E.D. Hirsch's little book on
"cultural literacy" is being marketed for the cocktail-party list at
the back, from which readers are
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tempted to mine those crucial,
jewel-like bits of data that every
American should be able to produce, just in case he is called to appear on College Bowl.
A last note. I think it would be
absurd to expect another movie of
this sort from Steven Spielberg.
One can hope, all the same. Spielberg is a man with real flair for assembling visual-verbal narratives
capable of reaching a wide audience. He happens to have stumbled
upon a source and a subject which
could change him even while he
was at work changing them. Or
perhaps more accurately: he discovered a context in which his
preoccupations pointed beyond
themselves, in which they had more
than a narcissistic significance.
There are no geniuses in California. There are no geniuses, least of
all among the moguls of the film
industry. But there are people in
whose vicinity useful work gets
done. Spielberg could be one of
them. May he, then, keep on striving-and may the bankers open
their vaults at his behest, especially
if he wants to work in the vein of
Empire of the Sun.
A note on videos of Empire of the Sun:
you probably didn't see this film
when it came to your local theater
because it never arrived there.
Moreover, a standard video presentation, designed to fit a TV screen,
will distort the widescreen compositions. Is there any way to get access
to Empire in something like its original form, without renting a sixteen
millimeter print? According to The
LaserDisc Newsletter, there will be a
laserdisc (and evidently a video)
version of Empire of the Sun which
preserves the original ratios-which
gives television viewers the entire
picture, instead of cutting it off
drastically at both ends. I should
add that no such version has appeared in Valparaiso, Indiana. But
it may elsewhere.
Cl
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Re11elation
By Peggy Payne. New York:
Simon and Schuster. 314 pp.
$18.95.

Only a handful of novels I have
reviewed for The Cresset over the
past several years have struck me as
forcefully as Peggy Payne's first
novel, Revelation. I would cite
among those that have stirred me
with similar strength Michael
Malone's Handling Sin, Robert
Towers' The
Summoning,
and
Cynthia Ozick's The Cannibal
Galaxy. These are all works that
contain the author's unmistakable
force of conviction and vision that
propels the narratives to move finally outside of themselves, to
point to the Word by which the
words are measured (yes, even
Ozick, the Jewish writer who seems
to be one of the few contemporary
writers recognized and rewarded
by the literary establishment for the
moral voice of her fiction).
Revelation is about Swain Hammond, minister of a liberal Protestant church in a university townintellectual, controlled, somewhat
distant, very careful. Married for
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fourteen years and childless by
choice, Swain wants no intrusions,
no unreasonable personal demands
placed upon him. His actions and
words seem to indicate that he
loves his wife, but he says at one
point that he cannot imagine loving
anything he could not take to bed.
As the pastor of Westside Presbyterian Church he is, predictably, not
an effective personal counselor, but
the congregation does not complain. They seem quite content
with his intellectual aloofness because it does not challenge them in
uncomfortable ways.
Swain is tempted occasionally to
vent his feelings-to yell an obscenity at a driver he narrowly misses
running into, for example. But he
is always aware of his own respectability and of the possibility that the
driver may turn out to be a
member of his congregation. He
spends his lifetime hiding his feelings from himself. That is why
what happens one evening in his
backyard is such a thrilling, shattering shock. All of a sudden Swain
Hammond hears the voice of God
speaking to him, saying, "Know
that the truth is . . . " For some
reason, God has chosen that time
and that place to enter Swain's
brain in a new, real way, and of
course Swain does not have any
idea how to receive the favor. In
fact, what may seem at first hearing
to be a favor turns out to be just
the opposite.

Only a handful of novels
I have reviewed for The
Cresset have struck me
as forcefully as Peggy
Payne's powerful new
novel, Revelation.
What God says to Swain unsettles
him because it doesn't make sense
and because he is not sure what his
The Cresset
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response should be. There are no
social rules to cover this situation.
There are no theological precedents that he is aware of. He cannot intellectualize this experience
or file it under some preconceived
category, to be considered later. Instead, he finds himself pushed into
a different way of living-a way
which forces him to experience
the intensity of the present moment. Paradoxically, the experience
also forces him to reconsider his
past, to remember incidents from
his emotionally deprived childhood.
He is compelled, in short, to confront himself and the sources of his
selfishness, fears, insecurities, and
neuroses-with the mediating influence only of his wife to whom he
has somehow managed to remain
faithful.
When he announces to his congregation that God has spoken to
him, the responses are predictable.
In a sermon he says, "I don't know
what to expect from you. Neither
do I know what to expect from
God. What I heard is not what I
ever would have hoped or expected
to hear. It hasn't given me any wisdom or any peace." A special session is called, the elders meet, and
it is recommended that the pastor
take some time off to receive
psychological help. But his congregation rallies, circulates petitions,
and asks him to stay. This means
that he is again ostensibly in control, and the temptation once more
is to handle the impossible dilemma
rationally and coolly.
But meanwhile Jakey Miles, the
child of members of Westside
church, has been seriously injured
in an accident on church property.
The boy is left blinded, and the
boy's father blames Swain, whose
response is physical anger at firstand then after a while a growing
sense of compassion. It is significant that it is Jakey and his friend
Bryan-children-who finally begin
to get through to Swain.
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What Swain Hammond wants
and has never received is a "call"a sure sign that God has chosen
him for the ministry. From early
childhood Swain knew that he
would someday be a clergyman, but
he never experienced what others
had talked about-a sense of clear
direction from God that this is
what God meant for him to do with
his life. Swain does receive his call,
finally, as God speaks to him again.
This time the message is clear, but
ironically it is also at this point that
he begins to wonder if he should
remain in the ministry. He is not
alone. His congregation also has
begun to wonder about a growing
arrogance they sense in their Dr.
Hammond, who is now displaying
behavior frighteningly close, in
their estimation, to charismatic
practice.
Without giving it all away, I will
say that the book concludes with
one of the most satisfyingly
"happy" endings I have read. Most
contemporary novels do not have
them because happy endings do
not seem true to us. They often
trivialize truth--even and particularly for the Christian who realizes
that the scandal of the cross is at
the heart of faith-that life on this
earth, at least, ends in pain and
suffering, even though there is the
promise of ultimate salvation.
Revelation confronts the agonies,
but also shows grace at work. It is
a redemptive piece of literature,
and I commend Simon and Schuster for publishing and promoting it
at a time when joy, particularly of
the religious sort, may play well in
Peoria but often is not acceptable
(if considered at all) in the book review columns of the nation's m~or
publications. Of course, Peggy
Payne's superb writing-the kind
that makes you remember why you
first began reading novels-makes
this book an obvious choice for any
publisher. Maybe, too, a reading
public that has mulled over Up-

dike's sex-theology-computer trinity
has been educated enough in
philosophic overstatement and now
hungers for a bit of narrative theology-an
excellent,
well-written
story-to make it all make more
sense. Not that God does all the
time. We need, like Swain Hammond, to learn to listen with more
than our ears and to read with
more than our minds.

Cl Jill Baumgaertner

Guided Grief Imagery
By Thomas A. Droege. New York:
Paullsf Press. 178 pp. $9.95.
You are sitting with a group of
people in a dimly lighted room.
Window shades have been drawn
to block the outside light, and the
doors are closed to keep away interrupting noises. Each person
moves his or her chair around to
such a position that it is possible to
relax. Someone leans his head back
against a wall. Voices are hushed,
then silenced. A cassett tape begins playing quiet music, which
fills the space without drawing attention to itself. As everyone settles
into comfortable positions, a soft
voice begins to speak:
"Relax in your chair and close
your eyes so that you can see what
is going on inside of you rather
than concentrating on what is happening outside of you ... breathing in . . . breathing out . . .
breathing in ... breathing out....
Let your inner spirit become still.
Let the concerns and the problems
of the day float away. You are
going into a quiet and peaceful
place, gradually downward into the
center of yourself. It is a comfortable place. What is going on outside
of you does not distract you, for
you are caught up by the movements within your inner being."
Your imagination, as it took you
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into the scenario above, may have
set you down in any number of
surroundings, but very likely one
of the last places in which you pictured yourself was a church. You
may have imagined yourself subject
to a group hypnotist. You might
have pictured yourself entering
some situation of psychological
therapy. You may even have felt
yourself participating in some sort
of seance. But very likely you did
not think of what you were doing
as having anything whatsoever to
do with church.
Yet church is exactly what Dr.
Thomas Droege has in mind as he
explores, in Guided Grief Imagery,
the possibility and potential for
"guided imagery" as a tool for
ministry and specificaly for death
and grief-related ministry. Building
especially upon the work of Ira
Progoff, Professor Droege offers
more than a new, effective way of
ministering to people who are dealing with loss and grief; he also
opens up for us broad new possibilities for ministering in other
situations and for ministering to
the whole person.
Faithful to the title of his book,
Guided Grief Imagery, Professor
Droege
focuses
his
attention
throughout primarily on human
grieving, dividing his book into two
major sections to discuss images of
death and to introduce guided imagery related to death. The first
major section of the book by itself
is a worthy resource, a compendium of imagery related to death
from the Christian tradition and its
Old Testament roots. The second
section is a handbook and continued training in the use of
guided imagery.
It is not within the scope of
Droege's book to provide an
exhaustive directory of death imagery. Nevertheless major themes
are well sketched out and illustrated. While death imagery can be
found throughout the Old Testa30
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ment, much of the most useful material has been deposited in the
psalms. Droege helpfully suggests
basic themes from the psalms related to human fears and God's
comfort, noting specific sources
and prompting our own memory to
add others. His general themes include Watery Chaos-Safe Passage,
Abandonment-Presence, and Terror-Trust.

This useful treatment is
a proper reminder that
human need for comfort
over against death has
taken different shapes
under various cultural
and historical influences.

In the New Testament Droege
finds materials from the gospels a
potent source for fertile imagery,
including stories such as the resurrection of Jesus, discourses on
themes such as saving life and losing it, parables such as the separation of the sheep and the goats.
Other New Testament materials
are suggested as well, and again
our minds are alerted to search for
further scriptural resources.
In this first half of Guided Grief
Imagery, Prof. Droege also very
helpfully sketches the manner in
which the use of Christian images
of death has changed over the centuries, noting the four categories of
Philippe Aries: tamed death, the
death of the self, the death of the
other, and forbidden death. This
useful treatment is a proper reminder that human need for comfort over against death has taken
different shapes under various cultural and historical influences. We
are reminded that what comforted
human fear in the fourth century
may remain true, but not necessarily comforting still, for twentieth-

century fear. This chapter again
displays the broad variety of Christian images available for the grieving: death as birth, heaven as our
home, and comfort for situations of
prolonged dying.
A look at images for grief ministry which come from the worship
resources of the church, especially
from the liturgical heritage of late
twentieth-century
Lutheranism,
concludes this first part of Guided
Grief Imagery. This section is quite
focused upon the resources of one
denominational group, but since
that heritage is a shared treasure
others will find themselves quite at
home, especially in relationship to
the Paschal Cycle and Funeral
Liturgy. The section on hymnody is
based upon Lutheran Book of Worship and is therefore less generalizable for others who use different
worship resources. Nevertheless a
good number of hymn stanzas are
printed out and hymnic imagery is
structured into basic categories.
Thus the treatment here can prove
a useful prompt for the exploration
of any specific hymnic heritage.
The second major section of
Guided Grief Imagery is devoted to
the actual use of guided imagery
techniques, and it approaches the
subject in two ways. Prof. Droege
begins by providing what is actually
a small handbook on "How to Use
Guided Imagery." His basic principles are twofold, first that the
deeper level of experience provided by guided imagery can be an
important element in the spiritual
life of Christians and, secondly,
that leadership in guided imagery
can be done by any sensitive person
who approaches the task with care
and a small amount of understanding. Thus, Droege's "handbook"
provides both an understanding of
the nature of guided imagery and
the beginning training that a leader
would need in using guided imagery, including steps to follow in effective leadership of guided imageThe Cresset

ery and suggestions on improving
skills in such leadership.
The greater part of the second
section of the book continues this
training process with actual exercises in guided imagery. Two chapters focus on the use of images
from the Psalms and from the
New Testament, Subsequent chapters treat imagery for specil.c situations which anticipate dying, grieving, and loss. Appropriate for use
in a wide variety of groups, the
exercises provide a healthful expansion of the church's grief ministry, preparing people ahead of
time for the inevitable losses and
partings that will be part of each
person's life. While these chapters
are full of exercises which can actually be used with groups, they also
are a continued training program,
complete with very useful notes for
leaders seeking to expand understanding and ability in the guided
imagery process.
As already noted, Droege's major
focus is on the use of guided imagery in ministry related to death
and dying, a focus kept in both
parts of the book. This is an area
of special interest and experience
for Droege, and also an area in
which he feels the Christian church
has much to say to modern culture.
The church has a long history of
dealing with death and dying and
of responding with ministry to the
begrieved. The church is certainly
the major agency in modern society
able and willing to make such a response. But when it comes to preparing people for grief and loss,
while the church has many resources at its disposal it often has
succumbed to our contemporary
denial of death. It is Droege's hope
that his volume will assist the
churches in more actively and powerfully pursuing this ministry of
preparation to face the loss situations fwm which we cannot forever
avert our eyes.
At the same time, Droege knows
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that there will be resistance to what
he provides. Part of the resistance
will simply have to do with the reluctance to face death and dying.
Another resistance will have to do
with using and experiencing something new, into which category
guided imagery will fall for most
people. But another whole level of
resistance will probably emerge
having to do with the very nature
of guided imagery, an exercise in
right brain function--creative, intuitive, and imaginative. As a culture we have had a heavy bias towards affirmation of only the rational, linear, left brain, with some
suspicion of the intuitive, creative,
imaginative, right brain functions.
And within the church the dream,
fantasy, freely symbolic abilities of
the mind have not only been suspect, they have even been feared as
tainted with evil, though both Old
and New Testaments are filled with
their manifestations.

There will indeed be
some resistance to
overcome for the
techniques of guided
imagery and creative
imagining to be embraced
by the church.
There will indeed be some resisfor
the
tance
to overcome
techniques of guided imagery and
creative imagining to be embraced
by the church as a vehicle for
spiritual development. But once accepted, such devices can become
vehicles for new and valid spiritual
growth and will open the door to
new healing ministry far beyond
the context of grief. This possibility
surfaces again and again in the
book, even while Droege maintains
his focus on grief. In fact Droege's
stated purpose is actually somewhat
broader than the specific focus of

his book, "to encourage the use of
guided imagery by Christians
within the context of the community of faith."
The material in Guided Grief Imagery by its very nature suggests
some areas of use beyond the scope
of the book itself. There are other
losses over which people grieve:
loss of jobs, loss of marriage, transitions to new locations. It would
take little imagination to use some
of Droege's material to minister in
such contexts. From there it would
be only a short step to modify some
other exercises to fit like situations.
And beyond that, other areas of
human life for which guided imagery might suggest itself could include exploration of relationship
building and conflict resolution,
overcoming fears and finding courage, facing life changes such as retirement or empty nest. Those with
creative insight might use guided
imagery based on scriptural material to explore sexuality and spirituality. Creative teachers could find
endless possibilities for ways in
which students of all ages could be
led into new ways to apprehend the
stories of scripture and the realities
of the faith.
Prof. Droege has done for us a
great service, if we are able to receive it. He has cracked the door
open for us to explore and apprehend the faith more broadly
and deeply than we have before
considered. He invites us to begin
rethinking many of our assumptions about how we have traditionally "gotten a handle" on the faith
from a chiefly rational, logical,
linear perspective. He has opened
the door for us to grasp the faith
in ways we have never dreamed,
largely because we have feared
dreaming, and to participate in a
spirituality which engages our
whole being. For all of this he is to
be thanked.

Cl David H. Kehret
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The Phone Call
Dot Nuechterlein
It was a rare occurrence: husband had gone back to the office
and children were working or out
with friends, so I was home alone
that night when the phone rang.
I spoke-twice-but heard no
reply. Then after my third hello
there was an odd sound, like a
and
moan.
combination
sob
"What's the matter?" I remember
asking. "Are you hurt? Who is it?
Are you okay?"
The sound continued, and I
began to feel alarmed. "Please say
something," I pleaded; "Do you
need help?" Still no answer.
My concern deepened. It's my
husband, I thought; he's had a
stroke and can't speak; it took all
his efforts to dial our number. I
said his name, and asked again if
he needed help. The sobbing went
on .
No, I thought, that isn't logical;
if it were my man he would make
another noise in response, like
dropping the phone or something,
as signal that he had heard me.
A more terrifying thought entered my mind . Something dreadful has happened to one of my
children, and whoever has called is
so upset he or she cannot bring
him/herself to speak the horrible
words. Now that was not totally unreasonable, since several weeks earlier I had received a middle-of-thenight call from a hospital in Texas,
telling me my son had been in an
accident. He was not seriously injured, but the few seconds of panic
experienced then probably set me
up to anticipate the worst now.
"Please," I begged, "please tell
me what is the problem. Please!"
Still I heard nothing but that
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strange muffled weeping sound.
Only moments had gone by, but
they seemed to be long ones.
Finally I said: "I can't stand this;
either you say something or I will
have to hang up."
That did it. Suddenly there were
words. But what words they were!
Foul, gross, perverted, expletiveundeleted words. I've had obscene
phone calls before, and I know
what you are supposed to do-slam
the receiver down hard in the guy's
ear. So I did.
And immediately regretted it! I
wanted to get him back on the line.
All of my "teacherly" instincts surfaced, and I wanted to say, "Hey,
buddy, give it up. You have no talent for this stuff. If that was supposed to be heavy breathing, you
need a lot more practice to be convincing. You can't fake what you
don't know, and I suspect you
haven't been confronted with
enough real passion, either your
own or anyone else's to know what
it sounds like. The real McCoy
does not get confused with crying!"
But it was too late. I was left to
shake my head, and, to be honest,
to giggle-both at him and at myself, for the foolishness of my reaction. I couldn't help wondering
what he thought, to get such a different response from what he
probably expected.
Not that I know for sure what
that was. Supposedly the obscene
caller gets his jollies from putting a
woman in a vulnerable position and
"hearing" her squirm.
I can't say as how I understand
that. I don't fully comprehend
rape, child abuse, violence, or other
such tragedies, either, but there at
least one can guess at some connection with anger or fear or frustration or hatred-there are real
people dealing with one another,
however terrible their actions. But

a phone call is anonymous and impersonal, and I just don't get it.
And then there's the question of
how it's done. Does a fellow flit at
random through a phone book and
pick a number? Does he just punch
buttons and take pot luck at some
resulting actual connection? Does
he ever call someone he knows? My
first such experience was back in
my probation/parole officer days,
and that's what I then thought. But
the experts said no, most of these
callers don't dial a "friend"-that
isn't what they are after.
In this case, I suspect it may have
been a kid trying a new game, not
really knowing how. Maybe he took
so long getting to the point because
he was trying to get up the nerve
to actually do it. Did I spoil his
debut? Was he practicmg his
technique, and I blew my part?
Maybe I should have just laughed
in his ear.
Or perhaps a sympathetic response would have helped. Now
that I think about it, I remember
noticing that when he started talking his voice was quite cold and expressionless, almost like he was
reading a script.
Maybe he'll call back sometime,
and I can give him some advice.
Hmmm, wonder if he reads the
classifieds-perhaps I could run an
ad. "WANTED: will the person
who got a funny reaction to his
obscene call last summer please call
again."
Which also makes me wonder
how serious researchers manage to
explore topics like this-how do
they find their sample subjects? It's
hard to imagine multitudes volunteering to tell all about it.
Maybe next time I'll have the
presence of mind to try to engage
the caller in conversation. Who
knows, it may open up a whole new
Cl
field to study.
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